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The Red and Blue Golden State: Why
California’s Proposition 11 Will Not Produce
More Competitive Elections
Anthony E. Chavez*
INTRODUCTION
In November 2008, Californians approved a redistricting
reform measure, Proposition 11, which, despite the promises of
its supporters, will have little effect on the competitiveness of the
state’s elections.1 The initiative shifted responsibility for the
redrawing of state legislative lines from the Legislature to an
appointed commission.2 Supporters promised that by taking the
process from self-interested legislators, the resulting districts
would be more competitive. However, an analysis of the state’s
demographics and the experience of other states suggests that a
significant increase in the competitiveness of California’s
legislative districts remains unlikely and may even be
undesirable. Indeed, because of the give-and-take nature of the
redistricting process, California would be served best by keeping
the initial responsibility for redrawing legislative lines with the
Legislature. A redistricting commission would be most helpful if
it focused on reviewing and revising plans developed by the
Legislature, rather than actually drawing the initial plan itself.
This article first reviews the legal standards applicable to
redistricting in California. It then discusses the most recent
redistrictings and the five failed attempts that have been made
to alter the redistricting process through ballot initiatives.
Section II addresses Proposition 11, the campaign, and the 2008
general election. Section III explores the benefits and detriments
resulting from more competitive district elections, the muchtouted benefit of Proposition 11. Section IV analyzes the decline
* Assistant Professor, Chase College of Law, Northern Kentucky University. The
author is grateful for the advice and contributions of Matthias A. Jaren and Joaquin G.
Avila and for the research assistance of Michelle Hugard and Kathryn Mattingly.
Participants at the Washington University workshop also provided valuable input, and
special appreciation is due to Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff for organizing it.
1 The full text of Proposition 11, as it appeared on the 2008 ballot, is available at
http://www.voterguide.sos.ca.gov/past/2008/general/text-proposed-laws/text-of-proposedlaws.pdf#prop11 (last visited Nov. 2, 2010).
2 See infra Part II.
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in competitive elections in California and the non-redistricting
causes of this decline. Section V looks to the experiences of other
states that have employed commissions and imposed
competitiveness standards on the drawing of their legislative
districts. Finally, the last two sections discuss the likelihood that
Proposition 11’s redistricting commission will be able to draw
more competitive districts and present an alternative approach
that would provide redistricting roles for both an independent
commission and the Legislature.
I. REDISTRICTING, “CALIFORNIA” STYLE
Proposition 11 is the first successful salvo in the ongoing
redistricting battle in California.3
To best appreciate the
measure’s significance, a review of the state’s redistricting
history is helpful. But, first, this article will look at the legal
constraints impacting redistricting prior to the passage of the
measure. Then, it will review the decline in competitiveness in
California’s district elections which has prompted most of the
concern over redistricting reform. Moreover, the article will
examine the battles over the state’s past redistrictings, both in
the courts and on the ballot.
A. Legal Constraints on Redistricting in California
Redistricting is the process of revising the geographic
boundaries of congressional or state legislative districts to
account for population shifts between decennial censuses.4 The
U.S. Constitution requires the federal government to conduct a
census every ten years for the purpose of apportioning
congressional seats among the states.5 The states typically
3 Two years later, California voters approved Proposition 20, which extends the
reach of Proposition 11 to encompass the redrawing of congressional districts. See
Proposition 20: Voter Information Guide, CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE,
http://www.voterguide.sos.ca.gov/propositions/20/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2010). In the
November 2010 election, California’s voters also rejected Proposition 27, which would
have repealed Proposition 11. See Proposition 27: Voter Information Guide, CALIFORNIA
SECRETARY OF STATE, http://www.voterguide.sos.ca.gov/propositions/27/ (last visited Dec.
28, 2010).
4 What You Should Know About the Apportionment Counts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU
(2000), http://www.census.gov/dmd/www/pdf/pio00-ac.pdf. Redistricting is distinct from
apportionment, which is the process of determining the number of seats to which each
state is entitled in the U.S. House of Representatives. Id.
5 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. Article I provides that the first census shall occur
within three years of the first meeting of congress; it further requires that the federal
government conduct future censuses within ten-year terms thereafter. Id. Now, “Census
Day” is the first day of April in years ending in zero. Key Dates—2010 Census, 2010
CENSUS, http://2010.census.gov/2010census/how/key-dates.php (last visited Oct. 22, 2010).
Within one week of the commencement of the Congress following the census, the
President must transmit to Congress a statement of the persons counted in each state and
its allocation of Representatives. 2 U.S.C. § 2a(a) (2006).
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redistrict their own state legislatures in conjunction with this
process. The California State Constitution, for instance, requires
that the state redistrict its election lines once every decade in the
year following the national census.6 Historically, the California
Assembly has shouldered responsibility for redrawing state
legislative and congressional district lines.7
Certain federal and state standards apply to the drawing of
election districts. First, the Supreme Court has determined that
congressional districts must have approximately equal
population. In Reynolds v. Sims,8 the Court held that political
equality under the Constitution “can mean only one thing—one
person, one vote.”9 This means that district populations should
be as nearly equal as possible.10 Courts have applied this
standard rigorously in congressional redistrictings.11 In the
context of state legislative plans, the Supreme Court has allowed
state legislatures greater latitude.12 Indeed, the Court has
indicated that deviations of at least sixteen percent are
acceptable.13
The other federal law that controls redistricting is the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 (Act), as amended and codified in Title 42 of
the United States Code.14 Depending upon the state involved,
two provisions of the Act may have implications for redistricting.
Section 2 of the Act applies to all states.15 Where certain
preconditions exist,16 section 2 prohibits dilution of minority
CAL. CONST. art. XXI, §§ 1–2.
§ 1 (amended 1980).
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
Id. at 558 (quoting Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1962)).
To calculate the ideal district population, divide the state’s total population by the
number of districts in the legislative body. THOMAS L. BRUNELL, REDISTRICTING AND
REPRESENTATION: WHY COMPETITIVE ELECTIONS ARE BAD FOR AMERICA 54 (2008). The
variance of a given district is the total population of a district divided by the ideal district
size. The overall or total deviation of a plan is the population difference between the
largest and smallest districts divided by the ideal district population. Chapter 3—Equal
Protection, MINN. SENATE, http://www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/departments/scr/redist/
Red2000/Ch2Equal.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2010).
11 See Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 530–31 (1969) (“[T]he ‘as nearly as
practicable’ standard requires that the State make a good-faith effort to achieve precise
mathematical equality.”).
12 See Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 326 (1973).
13 Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 161–62 (1993) (stating that Mahan upheld a
sixteen percent deviation because it was justified by a rational objective).
14 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971–1974 (2006).
15 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006).
16 The Supreme Court has identified three preconditions that must be present to
establish a violation of section 2. First, the minority group must be sufficiently large and
geographically compact so as to constitute a majority in a district. Second, it must be
politically cohesive. Third, the white majority must vote sufficiently as a bloc to enable it
to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50–51
(1986).
6
7
8
9
10
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voting strength.17 Line drawers typically use one or more of the
following techniques to dilute minority voting strength through
redistricting: “packing,” “cracking,” or “stacking.” “Packing”
involves concentrating as many minorities as possible into as few
districts as possible, thereby creating larger minority populations
than necessary to elect their candidates of choice and minimizing
the impact of minority votes.18 “Cracking” consists of splitting
concentrations of a minority population and dispersing them
among other districts to increase the number of districts
containing white-voting majorities.19 Finally, “stacking” refers to
combining concentrations of a minority population with larger
concentrations of a white population to ensure that the districts
contain white voting majorities.20
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act requires that changes
involving voting (such as the passage of a redistricting plan)
must be approved (“precleared”) by either the U.S. Attorney
General or the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.21
Section 5 prohibits “retrogression in the position of racial
minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral
franchise.”22 Section 5 extends only to nine states in their
entirety, and to portions of seven others.23 Four counties in
California fall under section 5.24 Section 5 applies when a
covered jurisdiction adopts a redistricting plan.25 Because four
counties in California are covered, the effects of any statewide
redistricting plan (congressional or legislative) on those four
counties fall within the preclearance requirement of section 5.26

17 Upon satisfaction of the three Gingles preconditions, courts must examine other
factors in the totality of circumstances. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1011–12
(1994). Those factors include: a history of official discrimination touching the right to
vote; racially polarized voting; the use of election procedures that may enhance the
opportunity for discrimination; the use of a candidate slating process; the extent to which
members of the minority group bear the effects of nonvoting discrimination which hinder
their ability to participate in the political process; the use of racial appeals in political
campaigns; the election of minority group members to public office; a lack of
responsiveness by elected officials to the needs of the minority group; the tenuousness of
policies underlying voting procedures; and proportionality, defined as the relationship
between the number of majority-minority voting districts and minority members’ share of
the relevant population. Johnson v. Hamrick, 196 F.3d 1216, 1220 (11th Cir. 1999).
18 Frank R. Parker, Racial Gerrymandering and Legislative Reapportionment, in
MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 85, 96 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1989).
19 Id. at 89.
20 Id. at 92.
21 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (2006).
22 Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976).
23 28 C.F.R. § 51 app. (2009).
24 The counties are Kings, Merced, Monterey, and Yuba. Id.
25 28 CFR § 51.13(e) (2009); Beer, 425 U.S. at 133.
26 Wilson v. Eu, 823 P.2d 545, 550 (Cal. 1992).
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California law also imposes certain requirements upon the
redistricting process. The California Constitution sets forth
several basic constraints. It reiterates the federal requirement
that the districts shall have reasonably equal population27 and
also requires that they be contiguous.28
In addition, the
California Constitution provides that the geographical integrity
of cities and counties be respected to the extent possible, without
violating other requirements.29
In addition, California recently passed its own state voting
rights act.30 While the California act is similar to the federal
statute, the state law explicitly removes geographic concentration of the minority group as a requirement for finding a
violation.31 Of course, some level of geographic compactness is
necessary to establish an interest in redistricting. For these
reasons, California’s voting rights act does not appear to create
any new constraints on its redistricting process.
B. Recent Trends in California District Elections
Despite the tradition in California (and elsewhere) of
legislative control of the redistricting process, the placement of
this responsibility in the hands of the Legislature has long been a
target of criticism.32 In general, critics have charged that
legislators are inherently self-interested in the outcome of
redistricting.33 Legislators have a number of incentives to exploit
the process for political gain, including protection of individual
incumbents, expanding partisan statewide majorities, and
punishing those with differences from the line drawers,
regardless of their party affiliation.34 Critics complain that
“politicians get to choose their voters, rather than the

CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 1(b).
CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(d)(3).
CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(d)(4).
CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 14025–32 (West 2009).
CAL. ELEC. CODE § 14028(c) (West 2009).
See Nicholas Stephanopoulos, A Fighting Chance for Redistricting, L.A. TIMES,
Sep. 27, 2008, at A21 [hereinafter Stephanopoulos, A Fighting Chance for Redistricting],
available at http://articles.latimes.com/2008/sep/27/opinion/oe-stephanopoulis27.
33 Id.
34 George Passantino, Redistricting in California: Competitive Elections and the
Effects of Proposition 11, REASON FOUNDATION 13 (Oct. 2008), http://reason.org/files/
79d00eb443669b026c8c37c483f0bdb0.pdf. While these are recognized incentives for
political gain through redistricting, they do not all lead to the same ultimate
configuration. For instance, the incentive of protecting individual incumbents encourages
increasing a party’s concentration in a particular district. Expanding a party’s statewide
share of districts, however, often requires drawing slimmer margins in each individual
district, as the plan spreads that party’s voters around to more districts. David Lublin &
Michael P. McDonald, Is It Time to Draw the Line? The Impact of Redistricting on
Competition in State House Elections, 5 ELECTION L.J. 144, 145 (2006).
27
28
29
30
31
32
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reverse . . . .”35 Or, as North Carolina State Senator Mark
McDaniel rather candidly admitted about the redistricting
process, “We are in the business of rigging elections.”36
While these arguments have tremendous emotional appeal,
of greater interest is whether proof of such practices can be found
in California. Critics of legislative redistricting identify several
indicia of these practices. First, one trend pointed out by
proponents of Proposition 11 during the 2008 campaign was the
decline in changes of party control of California’s Assembly
districts.37 Figure 1 tracks the number of seats in the Assembly
that have changed parties between 1960 and 2010:
FIGURE 138
Assembly District Party Turnover
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Editorial, Redistricting Defeats, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 2005, at A20.
John Hoeffel, Six Incumbents Are a Week Away from Easy Election, WINSTONSALEM J., Jan. 27, 1998, at B1.
37 See Passantino, supra note 34, at 13.
38 See Elected Offices, JOINCALIFORNIA, http://www.joincalifornia.com/page/9 (last
visited Jan. 4, 2011). Although data was available only through 2006 when Proposition
11 appeared on the ballot, this Article will include data through the November 2010
general election.
35
36
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The first striking fact about this chart is the two spikes in
the trendline. These spikes represent a high exchange of seats
between the parties in 1974 and 1992. Both of these occurred in
the first elections after the implementation of new redistricting
plans.39 Of course, these are not the only elections held after the
passage of new plans. California conducted elections pursuant to
new plans in 1962, 1982, and 2002. Why were 1974 and 1992 the
only years to have such extraordinarily high changes of seats
between the major parties? Possibly because the authors of those
plans were judges and not the Legislature.40
The other trend that Figure 1 highlights is the overall
decline of party turnover during the period analyzed. In the
1960s, the yearly exchange of seats averaged eight per election.
By the 2000s, the average turnover was down to less than two
per election. As was frequently noted during the Proposition 11
campaign,41 in the two elections prior to the 2008 election, no
Assembly seats changed party hands.42
Another possible indicator of legislative misuse of the
redistricting process is the decline in competitive elections.
Scholars have noted the decline of marginal districts over the
past thirty years.43 California’s elections have followed this
pattern; the number of competitive assembly seats has steadily
decreased. For instance, Passantino tracked the number of

39 In the 1970s, because of an impasse between the legislature and Governor Reagan
over the proposed redistricting plan, the California Supreme Court ordered that the state
use a temporary plan for the 1972 elections. The first election conducted under the
permanent plan was in 1974. Legislature v. Reinecke, 492 P.2d 385, 390–91 (Cal. 1972);
Legislature v. Reinecke, 516 P.2d 6, 9 (Cal. 1973).
40 See infra notes 51–53, 64–67 and accompanying text.
41 Stephanopoulos, A Fighting Chance for Redistricting, supra note 32.
42 See supra Figure 1. Ironically, this trend took a brief respite in the same election
in which the voters approved Proposition 11. Five assembly seats changed party hands in
November 2008. By 2010, however, the pattern returned, as the parties swapped only one
seat. See Figure 1.
43 Samuel Issacharoff & Jonathan Nagler, Protected from Politics: Diminishing
Margins of Electoral Competition in U.S. Congressional Elections, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1121,
1124–25 (2007) (showing a decline over the past sixty years in congressional elections
decided by ten percent and five percent margins between the top two candidates).
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assembly seats where the winner won no more than fifty-three
percent of the vote.44 Figure 2 presents the results:
FIGURE 245
Competitive Elections for California Assembly Seats
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In many respects, Figure 2 presents a picture quite similar
to that of Figure 1. In both Figures 1 and 2, the highest peak
occurs in 1974, which is immediately subsequent to the adoption
of that year’s plans. However, the second peak in Figure 1 occurs
in 1992, but in Figure 2 it does not arise until 1996. In other
words, in the 1990s, the highest number of districts changed
party hands in the year immediately after the redistricting, while
the number of competitive contests continued to increase. This
discrepancy may suggest that factors other than redistricting
affect competitiveness. Although Figure 2 also suggests that the
number of competitive districts had been in decline since the
1992 redistricting, as with Figure 1, it illustrates a significant,
though short-lived, rebound in the 2008 general election.46

Passantino, supra note 34 at 11–12.
See Elections by Decade, JOINCALIFORNIA, http://www.joincalifornia.com/page/10
(last visited Jan. 4, 2011).
46 The fact that eight of the nine competitive districts in 2008 had Republican
incumbents suggests that the rise in close contests may not reflect a general increase in
competitiveness, but rather the national trend supporting Democratic candidates in that
election. See generally Gary C. Jacobson, The 2008 Presidential and Congressional
Elections: Anti-Bush Referendum and Prospects for the Democratic Majority, 124 POL. SCI.
Q., no.1 (2009).
44
45
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This decline in competitive districts during the past two
decades coincided, not surprisingly, with the rise in sophisticated
tools for the line drawers. Indeed, the most significant change
occurred between the 1981 and 1991 redistricting cycles. For
instance, the architect of California’s 1981 redistricting,
Congressman Philip Burton, “used teams of individuals to
analyze massive hard-copy reports of voter registration data,
election results, census data, and precinct maps using simple
calculators and colored markers.”47 One decade later, the
available technology had changed dramatically. The Supreme
Court described the capabilities of the software REDAPPL, which
the Texas redistricters used in 1991:
REDAPPL permitted redistricters to manipulate district lines on
computer maps, on which racial and other socioeconomic data were
superimposed. At each change in configuration of the district lines
being drafted, REDAPPL displayed updated racial composition
statistics for the district as drawn. REDAPPL contained racial data
at the block-by-block level, whereas other data, such as party
registration and past voting statistics, were only available at the level
of voter tabulation districts (which approximate election precincts).
The availability and use of block-by-block racial data was
unprecedented; before the 1990 census, data were not broken down
beyond the census tract level.48

Thus, redistricters who sought to minimize competitiveness
suddenly found themselves armed with new, high-tech tools with
which to accomplish this objective.
C. California’s Redistrictings and Redistricting Ballot
Initiatives
In the past forty years, redistricting has been especially
contentious in California. Both the process and the resulting
plans have been the targets of litigation and of ballot measures.
These experiences helped to shape Proposition 11 and its
successful campaign.

47 Micah Altman, Karin Mac Donald, & Michael McDonald, From Crayons to
Computers: The Evolution of Computer Use in Redistricting, 23 SOC. SCI. COMPUTER REV.
334, 336 (2005). Because of the difficulty in using this data, Burton often relied upon his
own knowledge of the state’s demography and voting patterns to assess proposed districts.
Nevertheless, Burton was so knowledgeable that he was able to create a district plan that
swung five congressional seats to the Democrats. Id.
48 Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 961 (1996).
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Three of California’s past four redistrictings were the
subjects of litigation.
In 1971, the Democratic-controlled
Legislature and Republican Governor Ronald Reagan failed to
agree to a redistricting plan.49 Accordingly, the California
Supreme Court adopted temporary redistricting plans for the
1972 election.50 When the Legislature did not enact redistricting
plans in 1972, the California Supreme Court appointed special
masters to develop the plans,51 which it eventually adopted.52
In 1981, the Democrat-controlled Legislature passed
redistricting plans that Democratic Governor Jerry Brown
signed.53 Republicans, outraged over what they thought was
blatant partisan gerrymandering, commenced two separate
attacks to overturn these plans.54 First, they placed three
referenda on the June 1982 ballot; each proposition sought to
replace one of the redistricting plans (assembly, senate, and
congressional).55 Republicans hoped that new plans could take
effect immediately, but the California Supreme Court ordered the
state to use the 1981 plans for the 1982 congressional and
legislative elections.56 The three plans used for the 1982
elections each lost the referenda vote by an average margin of
sixty-three percent to thirty-seven percent.57
Moreover, in
Passantino, supra note 34, at 3.
Legislature v. Reinecke, 492 P.2d 385, 390–91 (Cal. 1972).
Legislature v. Reinecke, 507 P.2d 626, 627–28 (Cal. 1973).
Legislature v. Reinecke, 516 P.2d 6, 9 (Cal. 1973).
53 Assembly v. Deukmejian, 639 P.2d 939, 942 (Cal. 1982).
54 Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Reforming Redistricting: Why Popular Initiatives to
Establish Redistricting Commissions Succeed or Fail, 23 J. L. & POL. 331, 360 (2007)
[hereinafter Stephanopoulos, Reforming Redistricting]. Critics of the plans used colorful
language to voice their objections: “One Republican denounced the Burton plan as an
‘outrageous, blatant, partisan carving up of the people,’ another likened it to the Jewish
Holocaust, while a third, adding one more insensitive religious metaphor, compared
Speaker Brown to the contemporary Iranian theocrat, the Ayatollah Khomeini.” J.
Morgan Kousser, Reapportionment Wars: Party, Race, and Redistricting in California,
1971–1992, in RACE AND REDISTRICTING IN THE 1990S, at 134, 153 (Bernard Grofman ed.,
1998). For his part, Representative Burton, the architect of the plan, described a district
that spanned the San Francisco Bay and four counties as “my contribution to modern art.”
Daniel Borenstein, The California Experience: Why Most of the Media Ignored
Redistricting, 1 ELECTION L.J. 141, 142 (2002).
55 Kousser, supra note 54.
Proposition 10 challenged the congressional plan;
Proposition 11 sought to replace the state senate redistricting; and Proposition 12
challenged the assembly remap. California 1982 Ballot Propositions, BALLOTPEDIA,
http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/California_1982_ballot_propositions (last visited Oct.
23, 2010).
56 Assembly v. Deukmejian, 639 P.2d 939, 963.
57 Specifically, Proposition 10 lost 35.4% to 64.6%; Proposition 11 lost 37.8% to
62.2%; and Proposition 12 lost 37.9% to 62.1%. See CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE,
STATEMENT OF VOTE: JUNE 8, 1982, GENERAL ELECTION (1982). The wording of the
propositions provided that a “‘yes’ vote approves, a ‘no’ vote rejects” the redistricting
statutes involved. Thus, a majority of “no” votes for a measure overturned the particular
redistricting statute in question. Id.
49
50
51
52
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November 1982, a Republican was elected to replace Governor
Brown.58 Accordingly, the lame duck Democratic governor called
a special session of the Legislature to commence in December
1982, one month before Governor Brown was to step down, to
develop new plans.59 The Democrats drew plans that offered
sufficient protections to Republicans and garnered the necessary
two-thirds vote to receive “urgency” status,60 which caused the
plans to be sent to Governor Brown before the end of his term.61
The new plans remained in effect through 1990.62 As a second
means to overturn the Democrat’s plans, the Republicans placed
onto the November 1982 ballot Proposition 14.63
In 1991, Governor Pete Wilson vetoed the redistricting plans
approved by the Legislature.64 Since the Legislature did not
have sufficient votes to override the veto,65 the governor initiated
mandate proceedings in the California Supreme Court.66 The
court exercised its original jurisdiction and appointed three
special masters, whom they instructed to develop the
redistricting plans after conducting public hearings.67 The
California court accepted and adopted the Special Masters’
recommendations with minor modifications.68
Finally, in 2001, the Golden State avoided major litigation
over its redistricting plan when Democratic and Republican
leaders found common ground: preservation of incumbents.69 As
Badham v. Eu, 694 F. Supp. 664, 666 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
Id.
60 Pursuant to the California Constitution, “urgency statutes” must be “necessary for
immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety,” and passed by two thirds of
each house. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 8(d). Moreover, as an urgency statute, the statute
redistricting the state legislature was not subject to a referendum. Legislature v.
Deukmejian, 669 P.2d 17, 22 (Cal. 1983). The statute establishing the state’s new
congressional lines would have been subject to a referendum, but no one challenged it. Id.
61 Kousser, supra note 54, at 156.
62 Passantino, supra note 34, at 6.
63 See infra notes 76–84 and accompanying text.
64 Wilson v. Eu, 816 P.2d 1306, 1306 (Cal. 1991).
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 1307.
68 Wilson v. Eu, 823 P.2d 545, 559 (Cal. 1992).
69 Later, the state’s Republicans revealed that they reached this accommodation
after playing a “bluff” in 2001. Because of the strong Democratic majorities in the
legislature (twenty-six to fourteen in the Senate and fifty to thirty in the Assembly) and a
Democrat, Gray Davis, occupying the governor’s mansion, Democrats could pass
redistricting litigation without a single Republican vote. Republicans threatened to
submit the redistricting to a statewide referendum. Actually, however, the state party
had “absolutely no money for a referendum,” admitted then-Assembly Republican Jim
Brulte. Jim Sanders, Precursor to Prop. 77 ‘Orchestrated Well’: Both Parties Got What
They Wanted in 2001, at Least in the Short Term, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 19, 2005, at A3.
Despite their ability to pass redistricting legislation and the likelihood that a referendum
would not overturn the redistricting plans, Democrats accepted the deal. Considerations
for the Democrats included the ability to shore up several congressional seats won in
58
59
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the Los Angeles Times characterized the plan: “Most legislative
districts are so safe that the real battles are in the primary
elections.”70
The Legislature drew both congressional and
legislative lines “in a transparent effort to create ‘safe seats’ for
virtually all state and federal legislators . . . .”71 Accordingly, the
Democratic-controlled Legislature passed redistricting plans—
with no significant Republican opposition—that Democratic
Governor Gray Davis signed.72 Critics have described those
plans as “bipartisan gerrymanders”73 and “incumbent protection
gerrymanders.”74

2000, certainty over future district lines, and the concern that the Bush Administration
might use the Voting Rights Act to challenge the plan. Id.
70 Editorial, Serving the Pols, Not the People, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2004, at B10. An
analysis of the plans demonstrates the successfulness of their agreement. The following
table presents the number of assembly and state senate districts before and after the
redistricting that had registered voter differentials between Republicans and Democrats
of five percentage points or less:
TABLE 1
DISTRICTS WITH 5% REGISTRATION DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN REPUBLICANS AND DEMOCRATS
1992 AND 2002 REDISTRICTING PLANS
Pre-Redistricting

Post-Redistricting

Assembly

14

3

State Senate

7

1

Sanders, supra note 69. Table 1 shows the significant drop in the number of competitive
districts in both the Assembly and Senate after the redistricting.
71 Daniel P. Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection: On Discretion, Inequality,
and Participation, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2409, 2515 (2003).
72 Carl Ingram, Davis OKs Redistricting that Keeps Status Quo, L.A. TIMES, Sep. 28,
2001, at B12.
73 Michael S. Kang, The Bright Side of Partisan Gerrymandering, 14 CORNELL J. L.
& PUB. POL’Y 443, 464 (2005).
74 Lublin & McDonald, supra note 34, at 146. Ironically, the ultimate consequence of
the Democrats agreeing to the “bipartisan gerrymander” is that it prevented the heavilyDemocratic state from sharing in the Democratic electoral wave in 2006 and 2008. See
Dan Morain, Donors Give Millions, Hide Their Motives, SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 18, 2010,
at E1.
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Just as California’s redistricting plans have been hotly
contested, so has its redistricting process; redistricting has been
the subject of five California propositions since the 1980s.75 The
first four failed by significant margins.
The fifth finally
succeeded, but by less than two percentage points.
Proposition 14 appeared on the November 1982 ballot.76 It
sought to create a redistricting commission whose members
would be selected by judges, the major parties, and by any other
party representing at least ten percent of the Legislature.77
California Republicans were the primary financial supporters of
the proposition, and several interest groups also backed it.78 The
Democratic Party and its leaders, especially Governor Jerry
Brown and Assembly Speaker Willie Brown, were its primary
opponents.79 The proposition lost by a vote of 44.5% to 54.5%.80
After the defeat of Proposition 14 and the subsequent
blocking of the Sebastiani Plan, the Republicans, under the
stewardship of Governor Deukmejian, developed a new proposal
which became Proposition 39 on the November 1984 ballot.81
This measure proposed to establish a redistricting commission
with eight of its ten members consisting of retired state court
judges.82 Both parties spent approximately $4 million on the

75 The California Supreme Court blocked two additional proposals from being
submitted to the voters. Assemblyman Don Sebastiani (heir to the wine fortune) and
several Republican campaign consultants (still angry from the loss of potential fees that
would have resulted from another round of competitive elections under new redistricting
plans) prepared another referendum for a December 1983 special election. The proposed
statutes would redraw the congressional and state legislative districts. Kousser, supra
note 54, at 156. Collectively, they were dubbed the “Sebastiani Plan.” Alan Heslop,
REDISTRICTING REFORM IN CALIFORNIA 2 (2004), http://www.claremontmckenna.edu/rose/
publications/pdf/conf_redistricting_paper.pdf.
The state legislature and several
Democratic officeholders petitioned the California Supreme Court to prevent the holding
of the special election. Legislature v. Deukmejian, 669 P.2d 17, 18 (1982). The court ruled
that the state could only be redistricted once per decade. Id. at 22. The court also said
that the holding of the special election was prevented. Id. at 31. Two decades later,
Proposition 24, a proposal intended for the March 2000 ballot, would have transferred
responsibility for drafting redistricting plans from the state legislature to the California
Supreme Court, which would then appoint a panel of special masters to conduct hearings
and prepare the actual plans. Senate v. Jones, 988 P.2d 1089, 1092–93 (Cal. 1999).
Because the measure violated a requirement that propositions must involve only a single
subject (it also included provisions relating to the compensation of state legislators and
other officers), the state’s highest court blocked the proposal from appearing on the ballot.
Id. at 1105.
76 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
77 Heslop, supra note 75, at 1.
78 Stephanopoulos, Reforming Redistricting, supra note 54, at 361.
79 Id. at 361–62.
80 Passantino, supra note 34, at 6.
81 Kousser, supra note 54, at 157–58.
82 Heslop, supra note 75, at 2.
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campaign.83 Nevertheless, Proposition 39 lost by a similar
margin to that of Proposition 14, 44.8% in favor versus 55.2%
against.84
Having failed in the court of public opinion, the Republicans
shifted their efforts to actual courts. However, they had no
greater success.85 Thus, in anticipation of the post-1990 Census
redistricting, Republicans placed two propositions onto the June
1990 ballot.86 The first, Proposition 118, would have retained
initial authority over redistricting in the Legislature, but for such
plans to become law it would have required that the redistricting
plans receive two-thirds of the votes in each chamber, the
signature of the governor, and approval by the voters in a
referendum.87 Proposition 119, submitted by a second group of
Republicans, would have replaced the Legislature with a
bipartisan commission whose members were nominated by nonprofit, non-partisan organizations and selected by a panel of
retired judges.88 Supporters again contributed millions to the
campaigns.89 Proposition 118 failed by approximately 33% to
67%, while Proposition 119 lost by a vote of approximately 36% to
64%.90
Finally, in 2005, after becoming frustrated by working
with the Democratic-controlled state Legislature, Republican
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger made redistricting reform one
of his primary goals.91 He ordered a special election in 2005.92
Included on the ballot was Proposition 77, which would have
created a three-member commission to conduct the
redistricting.93 Proposition 77, along with the eight other
Stephanopoulos, Reforming Redistricting, supra note 54, at 363–64.
Heslop, supra note 75, at 3.
See Badham v. Eu, 694 F. Supp. 664, 666 (N.D. Cal. 1988). In Badham,
Republican Congressional representatives and voters challenged the redistricting bill
signed by Governor Brown in 1983 as an “intentional, invidious and effective
gerrymander” in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 667. The three judge
panel granted defendants’ motion to dismiss, holding that plaintiffs could not amend their
complaint to state a claim under Davis v. Bandemer. Id. at 673 (referring to Davis v.
Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986)).
86 Kousser, supra note 54, at 165.
87 Heslop, supra note 75, at 3.
88 Kousser, supra note 54, at 166; Heslop, supra note 75, at 4. If both propositions
passed, the measure that received the largest majority would prevail. Kousser, supra note
54, at 166.
89 One estimate calculated that the campaigns for and against the measure received
a combined total of $6 million. Kousser, supra note 54, at 166.
90 Heslop, supra note 75, at 5.
91 Stephanopoulos, Reforming Redistricting, supra note 54, at 372.
92 Proclamation, Governor Schwarzenegger Proclaims Special Election for November
8, 2005, OFF. OF THE GOVERNOR (June 13, 2005), http://gov.ca.gov/proclamation/2064/.
93 Stephanopoulos, Reforming Redistricting, supra note 54, at 372. Proposition 77
was just one part of a reform agenda for which the governor sought approval from the
83
84
85
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propositions on the ballot, lost; Proposition 77 failing by a vote of
40.5% in favor to 59.5% against.94
Thus, the five propositions after Baker v. Carr that were
submitted to California voters lost. Table 2 summarizes these
results:
TABLE 2
REDISTRICTING PROPOSITIONS
1982–2005

Year
1982
1984
1990
1990
2005

Measure
Proposition 14
Proposition 39
Proposition 118
Proposition 119
Proposition 77

For
44.5
44.8
33.0
36.2
40.5

Against Difference
54.5
-10.0
55.2
-10.4
67.0
-34.0
63.8
-27.6
59.5
-19.0

Support for these propositions never reached 45%.
Consequently, each proposition lost by a double-digit margin,
with an average differential of 20.2%.
With this as the background leading up to the 2008 election,
Proposition 11 qualified for the November 2008 ballot.
II. PROPOSITION 11: IF AT FIRST YOU DON’T SUCCEED . . .
In many ways, the passage of Proposition 11 in 2008 was
aberrational. Most things about the contest were unusual,
including its inception, fundraising, and support. Nevertheless,
despite the benefit of all of these factors, it still nearly did not
pass.95

voters. He also included on the ballot propositions that would delay teachers from
gaining tenure (Proposition 74), require employee consent to use union dues for political
contributions (Proposition 75), and limit increases in state spending (Proposition 76).
Jordan Rau, Governor Puts Agenda on Ballot, L.A. TIMES, June 14, 2005, at A1;
California Special Election, 2005, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/California_
special_election,_2005 (last visited Oct. 5, 2010).
94 Peter Nicholas & Jordan Rau, Results Unsettle Gov.'s Supporters, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 10, 2005, at A1. All of Governor Schwarzenegger’s measures lost despite his raising
and spending $56 million on them. The total spent for all of the propositions in that
election reached $300 million. Richard L. Hasen, Assessing California’s Hybrid
Democracy, 97 CAL. L. REV. 1501, 1502 (2009).
95 CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE: NOVEMBER 4, 2008,
GENERAL ELECTION 7 (2008) [hereinafter STATEMENT OF VOTE 2008], available at
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2008_general/sov_complete.pdf.

Do Not Delete

326

3/16/2011 4:50 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 14:311

During the post mortem of the 2005 special election, one
critique found that Governor Schwarzenegger “took on too much.
He took on everybody in sight.”96 Accordingly, in 2008 he
narrowed his focus to one target: redistricting.
Perhaps more importantly, as in any good sequel, several
new actors joined Schwarzenegger.
One factor that set
Proposition 11 apart from its predecessors was the breadth of its
conception and subsequent support. The proposal arose not from
one of the political parties or the governor, but from the efforts of
“good government” non-profit organizations—the drafters of the
measure included the California branches of AARP, Common
Cause, and the League of Women Voters.97 The authors of the
ballot arguments were the presidents of the California Taxpayers
Association and the California offices of the League of Women
Voters and AARP.98
In addition to these organizations,
proponents of the measure included the Los Angeles Chamber of
Commerce, the California Chamber of Commerce, the California
NAACP, the California Police Chiefs Association, and the ACLU
of Southern California.99
The proposition also received
endorsements from a broad range of editorial boards.100
Politically, the supporters of Proposition 11 were similarly
diverse. Despite its non-profit roots, the measure became
identified with Republican Governor Schwarzenegger.101 This
occurred for good reason since he was an active campaigner and

Nicholas & Rau, supra note 94.
Kathay Feng, Executive Director, Common Cause, Gov. Schwarzenegger Touts
Redistricting Reform, Highlights Continued Fight for Reform in California (Dec. 17,
2008), http://gov38.ca.gov/index.php?/speech/11278/.
98 California Online Voter Guide—2008 General Election, CAL. VOTER FOUND.,
http://www.calvoter.org/voter/elections/2008/general/props/prop11.html (last visited Oct.
23, 2010).
99 California Passes Proposition 11 on Redistricting Reform, AMERICANS FOR
REDISTRICTING
REFORM,
http://www.americansforredistrictingreform.org/documents/
Proposition11.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2010). Organizations with a particular focus on
the interests of California’s minority populations, however, largely opposed Proposition
11. Opponents included the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed
Officials, the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund, the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund, and the Asian Pacific American Legal Center. Id.
100 Included among the papers to endorse the measure were the Los Angeles Times,
San Francisco Chronicle, San Jose Mercury News, Fresno Bee, Torrance Daily Breeze, San
Diego Union Tribune, Pasadena Now, L.A. Daily News, North County Times, Stockton
Record, San Gabriel Valley Tribune, Santa Cruz Sentinel, Lompoc Record, and Redding
Searchlight. California Proposition 11 (2008), BALLOTPEDIA, http://www.ballotpedia.org/
wiki/index.php/California_Proposition_11_(2008) (last visited Jan. 5, 2011). The same
source does not identify any editorial boards opposed to Proposition 11.
101 See, e.g., Nancy Vogel, Prop. 11 Aims to Redo Remap, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2008, at
B1 [hereinafter Vogel, Prop 11 Aims].
96
97
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fundraiser for the proposal.102 Despite its close connection to the
Republican governor, the proposition nevertheless received
significant support from high-profile Democrats. For instance,
Gray Davis, the chief executive who Schwarzenegger replaced
through the 2003 recall election, supported Proposition 11.103
Other prominent Democratic supporters included Treasurer Bill
Lockyer, former Assembly Speaker Robert Hertzberg, and former
Controller Steve Westly.104 California Forward, a recentlycreated reform group, also supported the measure.105 The
organization’s co-chair was Leon Panetta, former eight-term
Democratic congressman and chief of staff for President
Clinton.106
While Proposition 11’s support was broad-based, its funding
was anything but. Of the $14 million contributed to the
campaign, traditional Democratic supporters gave less than $1
million.107 Governor Schwarzenegger, in addition to campaigning
for the measure, also supported it financially. His campaign
contributions
approached
$3 million.108
Not
only
did
contributions skew Republican, significant amounts came from
Republicans outside of California. Non-California Republican
contributors included New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg,
T. Boone Pickens,109 and a group of Florida Republicans who
donated large sums of money after a personal visit from
Schwarzenegger.110

B1.
B1.

102

Michael Rothfeld, Governor Talks, and Funds Flow, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2008, at

103
104

Vogel, Prop 11 Aims, supra note 101.
Id.; George Skelton, Prop. 11 Beats the Alternative, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2008, at

George Skelton, Obama Takes the State’s Best Bet, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2009, at B1.
Id.
John Howard, Redistricting: Ultimate Political Battle Looms in California,
CAPITOL WKLY., June 18, 2009, at A7; Nancy Vogel, California Elections: Key Prop. 11
Donors Have GOP Ties, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2008, at B1 [hereinafter Vogel, California
Elections].
108 George Skelton, Prop. 11 Lead Signals Voters’ Reform Mood, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 13,
2008, at B1.
109 Vogel, Prop 11 Aims, supra note 101.
110 Vogel, California Elections, supra note 107.
This may overstate their
contribution, since bankruptcy attorneys are seeking the return of $250,000 contributed
from Florida attorney Scott Rothstein, who pleaded guilty in January 2010 to running a
billion-dollar Ponzi scheme. Anthony York, Refund Sought for Disgraced Florida Lawyer’s
Donation to California’s Prop. 11 Campaign, L.A. TIMES POLITICAL BLOG (May 5, 2010,
3:50 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/california-politics/2010/05/florida-lawyers-wantrefund-for-california-political-contribution.html.
105
106
107
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Not only did Democrats not contribute to the campaign for
Proposition 11, they did not contribute much to the opposition
campaign either. In contrast to the $14 million contributed in
support of Proposition 11, the “No on 11” campaign received only
$1 million.111
Also, in contrast to previous redistricting measures,
Proposition 11 took a different approach to reform. Earlier
propositions provided significant roles for either the major
parties or for retired state court judges.
For instance,
Proposition 14 (1982) and Proposition 39 (1984) would have
allowed the major parties to nominate the redistricting
commission members.112 Two of the propositions, 39 (1984) and
77 (2002), would have required that retired judges serve as
commission members.113 Finally, two measures would have had
judges either nominate (Proposition 14) or appoint (Proposition
119) the commissioners.114
Proposition 11, on the other hand, minimized the role of the
parties and eliminated any role for retired judges.115 Instead, it
proposed to establish a “Citizens Redistricting Committee”
(CRC).116 The CRC would draw new district lines for the State
Senate, Assembly, and Board of Equalization; under the
proposition, the Legislature retained the authority to redraw
congressional districts.117

Howard, supra note 107.
Heslop, supra note 75, at 1–2.
Id. at 2; Stephanopoulos, Reforming Redistricting, supra note 54, at 372.
Heslop, supra note 75, at 1, 4.
Retired judges were lightning rods for opponents’ attacks in earlier campaigns.
Steven F. Huefner, Don’t Just Make Redistricters More Accountable to the People, Make
Them the People, 5 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 37, 41 (2010). Presumably for this
reason, the drafters of Proposition 11 eliminated any role for them.
116 CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 1(d), amended by Prop. 11, § 3.2.
117 CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(a), amended by Prop. 11, § 3.3; CAL. CONST. art. XXI,
§ 1(b), amended by Prop. 11, § 3.2. The drafters decided to exclude congressional districts
from the reach of Proposition 11 to reduce the likelihood that Speaker of the House Nancy
Pelosi would aggressively oppose the measure. Vogel, Prop 11 Aims, supra note 101.
Pelosi had vowed to finance the opposition effort heavily if Congress was included. John
Howard, New Redistricting Initiative Targets Congressional Seats, CAPITOL WKLY. (Sept.
3, 2009, 12:00 AM), www.capitolweekly.net/article.php?xid=y859w0qbbs932v. Although
Pelosi and Senator Barbara Boxer did support the opposition, the $1 million raised by
opponents fell far short of the $14 million contributed in favor of the proposition. Howard,
supra note 107. By contrast, when congressional lines were implicated in 2005’s
Proposition 77, Pelosi spearheaded the effort to defeat the motion. In fact, after the 2005
election, the opposition campaign had more money in the bank ($4 million) than the “No
on 11” campaign raised during the entire campaign ($1 million). Anthony York,
Redistricting Fight—from Riches to Rags, CAPITOL WKLY., Oct. 9, 2008, at A1.
111
112
113
114
115
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The CRC would consist of fourteen members: five Democrats,
five Republicans, and four persons not registered with either
party.118 Unlike prior proposals, neither the parties, retired
judges, nor organizations would nominate prospective members;
instead, they would submit applications.119 The State Auditor
would establish a panel of three State Auditors to screen the
applicants.120 This panel would strike applications of persons
who did not meet a series of requirements identified in the
proposition.121 Then, this pool of qualified applicants would be
reduced as follows:
(1) The state auditors would narrow each of the three groups
to twenty members;122
(2) The majority and minority leaders of the Assembly and
Senate could each strike up to two applicants;123 and
(3) The State Auditor would randomly draw three
Democrats, three Republicans, and two persons not
registered with either party, and these persons would serve
on the Citizens Redistricting Committee.124

CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(c)(2), amended by Prop. 11, § 3.3.
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8252(a)(1) (West Supp. 2010), added by Prop. 11, § 4.1.
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8252(b) (West Supp. 2010), added by Prop. 11, § 4.1.
Proposition 11 contains the following minimum criteria for CRC members: (1) Be
continuously registered in California and have not changed parties for at least five years,
see CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(c)(3), added by Prop. 11, § 3.3; (2) Have voted in two of the
last three statewide general elections, see CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(c)(3), added by Prop.
11, § 3.3; (3) Within ten years of application, neither the applicant nor an immediate
family member had: served as a candidate for federal or state office, served as an officer,
employee, or consultant of a political party, served as a member of a political party central
committee, been a registered lobbyist, served as paid congressional, legislative or Board of
Equalization staff, contributed $2,000 or more to any candidate for elective office in any
year, see CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8252(a)(2)(A) (West Supp. 2010), added by Prop. 11, § 4.1.
While presumably well intended, these limitations would have the effect of filtering out
many of the most qualified applicants. Consequently, as Arturo Vargas, the Executive
Director of the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials noted, “We
have to identify those folks who are not engaged . . . and convince them to serve.” Shane
Goldmacher, Drawing Lines, Erasing Biases, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2010, at AA1.
122 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8252(d) (West Supp. 2010), added by Prop. 11, § 4.1.
123 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8252(e) (West Supp. 2010), added by Prop. 11, § 4.1.
124 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8252(f) (West Supp. 2010), added by Prop. 11, § 4.1.
118
119
120
121
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Finally, these eight members would then select two
additional members from each of the three sub-pools.125 Figure 3,
prepared by the California Legislative Analyst’s Office, presents
this selection process graphically:
FIGURE 3126

CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8252(g) (West Supp. 2010), added by Prop. 11, § 4.1.
Proposition 11, CAL. LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF. (July 17, 2008), http://www.lao.ca.gov/
ballot/2008/11_11_2008.aspx (internal figure number omitted).
125
126
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Proponents and opponents alike recognized the unusual
nature of these procedures. Bob Stern, the president of the
Center for Governmental Studies, helped draft Proposition 11.127
Stern acknowledged that the measure is “complicated . . . . It
does take a lot of understanding to vote yes on this.”128 George
Skelton, a political commentator with the Los Angeles Times and
Proposition 11 advocate, described its process as “convoluted.”129
Other words used to characterize these procedures included
“complex,” “confusing and unfair,” and “byzantine.”130 Probably
the most colorful description, however, was the following: “The
mechanisms for selecting the panel seem about as convoluted as
the weaning out process of a reality TV series.”131
Proposition 11 provides criteria that the CRC must follow in
drawing new districts. First, it must comply with the federal
requirements of equal population and the Voting Rights Act.
Second, districts shall be contiguous. Third, districts must
respect the geographic integrity of sub-jurisdictions to the extent
possible. Fourth, to the extent possible, districts should be
geographically compact. Finally, Assembly districts should be
nested within Senate districts—two Assembly districts wholly
within each Senate district.132

127 CENTER FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, REDISTRICTING REFORM IN CALIFORNIA:
PROPOSITION 11 ON THE NOVEMBER 2008 CALIFORNIA BALLOT 5 n.2 (2008),
http://www.cgs.org/images/publications/redist_memo_rpt_102408_fin.pdf.
128 Debra J. Saunders, Return to Redistricting Sanity, RASMUSSEN REPORTS
(Oct. 5, 2008), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/political_commentary/
commentary_by_debra_j_saunders/return_to_redistricting_sanity.
129 George Skelton, Reform Takes a Tough Road, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2010, at A2.
130 Howard, supra note 107; Matthew Yi, Prop. 11 Leading in Early Returns, S.F.
CHRON. (Nov. 5, 2008), http://articles.sfgate.com/2008-11-05/news/17127045_1_redrawingdistrict-district-lines-independent-citizen. Recently, Professor John N. Friedman of
Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government called the selection process “a foray into
uncharted territory” that could produce a highly positive outcome or “it could really be a
disaster.” John Mecklin, Redrawn and Quartered: Will the Extraordinary California
Experiment in Redistricting Spread to Other States?, MILLER-MCCUNE, Mar./Apr. 2010, at
8, 10.
131 Saunders, supra note 128.
132 CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(d), amended by Prop. 11, § 3.3.
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Despite its vast fundraising and endorsement advantages,
Proposition 11 had a difficult time attracting the attention of
voters.133 As Figure 4 indicates, in every poll taken in the five
months preceding the election, support for the measure never
exceeded forty-five percent:
FIGURE 4134

For most propositions, political consultants expect support to
fall during the campaign. Thus, experts anticipated a difficult
road ahead for Proposition 11.135 Furthermore, at least twentyfive percent of voters remained undecided about the proposition,
though this number rose to thirty-five percent on the eve of the
election.136
Thus, prior to the election, the factors relating to Proposition
11 were mixed. It had overwhelming advantages in fundraising
and endorsements.
On the other hand, four previous
redistricting initiatives in California had lost by an average
133 Nationally, this election involved the historic candidacy of Barack Obama. In
California, the ballot also included Proposition 8, which would have restricted the
definition of marriage to opposite-sex couples, thereby overturning the California
Supreme Court's ruling of the In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), that samesex couples have a constitutional right to marry.
134 California Proposition 11 (2008), supra note 100.
135 A low percentage of “Yes” voters “is always kind of ominous. Usually initiatives
have to start out with a big lead to withstand the No campaign against it,” said Mark
DiCamillo, Field Poll director. York, supra note 117.
136 California Proposition 11 (2008), supra note 134.
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margin of twenty percentage points.137 Furthermore, voter
support for Proposition 11 appeared at best to be tepid.138
In fact, Proposition 11 did succeed, but barely. In the closest
proposition contest on the ballot, the measure prevailed by a
margin of 50.9% to 49.1%.139
Although it passed, this result may not reflect enthusiastic
support, but instead that its supporters were less likely to ignore
the proposition than were its opponents. Table 3 provides a
recap of the initiatives that were on the November 4, 2008 ballot:
TABLE 3140
COMPARING SUPPORT FOR PROPOSITIONS
NOVEMBER 2008

1A
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

Proposition Number and Description
High-Speed Train Bond
Farm Animals Confinement
Children’s  Hospital  Bond
Parental Notification
Nonviolent Drug Offenses Sentencing
Police and Law Enforcement Funding
Renewable Energy Generation
Eliminates Same-Sex Couples Marriage
Criminal  Justice  System  Victims’  Rights
Alternative Fuel and Renewable Energy Bonds
Redistricting
Veterans’  Bond  Act

% of
Total "Yes" Votes
and "No" Cast for
Votes Prop 11
12,696,429
105.9
12,935,507
107.9
12,638,905
105.4
12,948,951
108.0
12,721,989
106.1
12,384,019
103.3
12,657,416
105.5
13,402,566
111.8
12,411,433
103.5
12,562,820
104.8
11,992,688
100.0
12,288,826
102.5

Table 3 presents the twelve propositions on the November
2008 ballot and the total votes in the contest. The last column
represents the ratio of votes cast for each proposition compared
to the total votes cast for Proposition 11. It shows that fewer
voters cast a vote—either “Yes” or “No”—for Proposition 11 than
for any other proposition. Between 2.5% more votes (290,000)

See supra Table 2.
See supra Figure 4.
CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE: NOVEMBER 4, 2008,
GENERAL ELECTION 7 (2008) [hereinafter STATEMENT OF VOTE 2008], available at
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2008_general/sov_complete.pdf.
140 Id. at 7.
137
138
139
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and 11.8% more votes (1.4 million) were cast for propositions
other than for Proposition 11. One consideration is voter roll-off,
which tends to be greater the lower an issue physically appears
on the ballot.141 Since Proposition 11 was the second to last
measure in the election, roll-off could explain this disparity.
Studies, however, have found that voter roll-off in lower visibility
contests can be double that of higher visibility contests.142 The
reverse seems to have occurred in California in 2008, where a
higher visibility contest, Proposition 11, had a higher roll-off
than did lower visibility measures.143
Despite the effort expended in support of the measure, both
the opposition and the electorate in general displayed
ambivalence toward Proposition 11. Certainly, most Democratic
leaders opposed the motion. The “No on 11” campaign listed both
Speaker Pelosi and Senator Boxer as members.144 Furthermore,
with significant majorities in both state houses, Democrats
seemed to be the party with the most to lose.145 Nevertheless, the
measure’s drafters specifically excluded congressional redistricting from its reach to avoid a major fundraising effort by
Pelosi.146 This strategy worked. In 2005, Pelosi spearheaded the
fundraising effort, but she also received significant assistance
from California Senate President Pro Tem Don Perata and thenAssembly Speaker Fabian Nunez.147 Furthermore, two powerful
unions in California, the California Teachers Association and the
Service Employees International Union, staunchly opposed the
governor’s special election slate in 2005.148 In 2008, both unions
were neutral on Proposition 11.149
As a result of these
differences, in 2005 the opposition to Proposition 77 spent $13

141 Roll-off is “[t]he difference between how many people go to the polls and how many
people actually vote on a specific [contest].” David C. Brody, The Use of Judicial
Performance Evaluation to Enhance Judicial Accountability, Judicial Independence, and
Public Trust, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 115, 127–28 (2008). In legal and academic literature,
“roll-off,” “falloff,” “dropoff,” and “ballot fatigue” refer to the same concept. Id. at 128. In
the November general election, the total votes cast were 13.74 million. STATEMENT OF
VOTE 2008, supra note 139, at 3. Thus, even Proposition 8, the measure with the highest
votes cast, experienced some roll-off (340,000 votes). Id. at 62.
142 James Sample, Caperton: Correct Today, Compelling Tomorrow, 60 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 293, 301 n.34 (2010).
143 For instance, despite Governor Schwarzenegger’s campaigning and national
fundraising efforts, Proposition 11 received fewer votes than did two bond initiatives,
Propositions 10 and 12. See supra Table 3.
144 Howard, supra note 107.
145 Vogel, California Elections, supra note 107.
146 Vogel, Prop 11 Aims, supra note 101.
147 York, supra note 117.
148 Id.
149 Id.
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million150 (which does not include $4 million in unexpended
funds);151 in 2008, the opposition to Proposition 11 spent only $1
million.152
Apparently, the Democrats’ reserved approach to the
measure stemmed from more than just Proposition 11’s failure to
apply to congressional redistricting. Possibly because of the
weak performance of previous redistricting initiatives, the
Democrats did not expect Proposition 11 to succeed.153
Voters also lacked enthusiasm for the redistricting measure.
As Figure 4 demonstrates, throughout the campaign, polling
indicated that at least twenty-five percent of voters were
undecided regarding Proposition 11, peaking at thirty-five
percent on the eve of the election.154 For their part, prospective
voters indicated that the measure was low on their list of
priorities for the election.155 Besides the presidential election,
among the eleven other initiatives on the ballot was Proposition
8, regarding same-sex marriage.156 In contrast to the combined
$15 million raised in support and opposition of Proposition 11,
Proposition 8 raised a combined total of $83.2 million from both
sides.157 The high roll-off for Proposition 11 likely resulted from
the mixture of many factors: confusion, uncertainty, placement
on the ballot, ballot fatigue,158 and attention focused on other
choices on the ballot.
150 LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS ET AL., BUILDING A NATIONAL REDISTRICTING REFORM
MOVEMENT:
REDISTRICTING
CONFERENCE
REPORT
11,
available
at
http://www.americansforredistrictingreform.org/html/documents/SLCRedistrictingReport
FINAL.pdf.
151 York, supra note 117.
152 Howard, supra note 107.
153 Editorial, A Political Triple Whammy, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2010, at A12.
154 Likely some of this uncertainty resulted from the complexity of the proposition
itself. See supra text accompanying notes 127–131.
155 As one voter who admitted that she abstained from voting on the proposition
stated: “Redistricting. We need to do more immediate things.” Tamara Audi et al.,
California Votes for Prop 8, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 5, 2008, 10:59 PM), http://online.wsj.com/
article/NA_WSJ_PUB:SB122586056759900673.html.
156 See supra Table 3.
157 Lisa Leff, Donors Pumped $83M into Prop. 8 Race, KSL.COM (Feb. 2, 2009,
8:05 PM), http://www.ksl.com/?nid=148&sid=5490691. The measure’s sponsors raised
$39.9 million and spent all but $983,000; the opposition received $43.3 million and had
$730,000 left after the election. Id. As another indicator of the interest in this measure, it
received the highest vote total of any of the measures in the election. See supra Table 3.
Another initiative, Proposition 2, which sought to impose standards for confinement of
certain farm animals, also attracted significant contributions; supporters contributed
$10.6 million, and opponents donated $8.9 million. California Proposition 2 (2008),
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/California_Proposition_2_(2008) (last visited Oct.
23, 2010).
158 While more ballot initiatives lead to higher turnout, too many policy questions
may have a negative effect of decreasing turnout. See Caroline J. Tolbert, John A.
Grummel & Daniel A. Smith, The Effects of Ballot Initiatives on Voter Turnout in the
American States, 29 AM. POL. RES. 625, 635 (2001). See also Kirk J. Stark, The Right to
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Was the passage of Proposition 11 foreseeable despite the
abysmal track record of California redistricting initiatives?
Under the circumstances, yes. After reviewing redistricting
initiatives nationwide, Nicholas Stephanopoulos developed a set
of factors leading to the passage of such measures. He analyzed
the campaigns of every redistricting initiative since 1936,159
including the California predecessors of Proposition 11, and
initiatives from Arkansas (1936), Oklahoma (1960 and 1962),
North Dakota (1973), Colorado (1974), Ohio (1981 and 2005), and
Arizona (2000).160 Stephanopoulos concluded that the most
important variable in determining a proposition’s success was
the legislative-majority party’s opposition to the measure.161 He
identified several characteristics of successful opposition
campaigns run by the majority party including “raising large
sums of money, campaigning furiously against the measure, and
striving to frame the debate in the most advantageous possible
terms.”162
A comparison between the campaigns of the two most recent
California redistricting initiatives supports Stephanopoulos’
conclusion. In 2005, the opposition to Proposition 77 raised
$14 million; in 2008, the “No on 11” campaign raised only
$1 million.163 In 2005, Speaker Pelosi pledged: “I am very
committed to defeating Proposition 77, and I am raising money to
defeat it.”164 In 2008, she basically sat on the sidelines since the
measure did not involve congressional districts. In 2005, the
opposition successfully characterized the proposition as “a
Republican power grab.”165 In 2008, the “Yes on 11” campaign
succeeded by focusing on anti-incumbent sentiments.166
Vote on Taxes, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 191, 248 (2001) (noting that voters feel a “ballot fatigue”
when “faced with ever longer lists of issues to decide on election day”).
159 Stephanopoulos, Reforming Redistricting, supra note 54, at 346.
160 See id.
161 Id. at 380. In reaching this conclusion, Stephanopoulos also identified several
factors that were not dispositive. These included the governor’s position on the
proposition, the legislative minority’s support, the actual proposal, interest group
positions, and the extent of any recent gerrymanders. Id. at 379–80.
162 Id. at 381.
163 See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
164 Christian Berthelsen, Group Backing Remap Initiative Caught up in Donations
Dispute, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 7, 2005, at B3. As part of this commitment, she asked all
thirty-three California Democrats in Congress to contribute against the proposition. Id.
165 Hubert Huang, The Strange Journey of Proposition 77, CARDINAL INQUIRER (Nov.
3, 2005), http://www.stanford.edu/class/comm273/2005/hhboy77/strangejourney.html (“In
an attempt to dispel the notion that the proposition is a disguise for a Republican power
grab, Schwarzenegger went to Ohio and show [sic] his support for its redistricting
initiative, the Democrat-backed Issue 4.”).
166 John Wildermuth, Prop. 11 Won By Not Talking About Redistricting, S.F. GATE
POLITICS BLOG (Dec. 1, 2008, 6:06 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/blogs/nov05election/
detail?blogid=14&entry_id=33086#ixzz0swyfQTzL.
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Nicholas Mosich, on the other hand, argues that 2005’s
Proposition 77 actually lost because of three different factors.
Specifically, he identified: “(1) California’s history of resistance to
redistricting reform initiatives, (2) fierce bipartisan opposition to
Proposition 77, and (3) voters’ perception of the special election
as a referendum on Governor Schwarzenegger’s leadership.”167
Looking solely at the 2005 election, Mosich’s conclusions are
appealing; they do not, however, explain the subsequent success
of Proposition 11.
First, Californians certainly have
demonstrated a reluctance to adopt a new redistricting
procedure.168 Indeed, this reluctance may have manifested itself
in the narrowness of Proposition 11’s victory. Nevertheless, the
measure did taste victory. Furthermore, even if this history were
a factor, one would expect it to have a greater effect in 2008, only
three years after the defeat of Proposition 77, rather than in
2005, fifteen years after the last failed proposition.169 Second,
Schwarzenegger’s approval and disapproval ratings were almost
identical shortly before each election. According to the Field Poll,
his approval ratings rose from thirty-seven percent in October
2005 to thirty-eight percent in September 2008; and during the
same period, his disapproval ratings fell from fifty-six percent to
fifty-two percent.170 Thus, two of the factors identified by Mosich
do not help to explain Proposition 11’s success. The second factor
he identifies, fierce bipartisan opposition, may help to explain
Proposition 77’s failure. It does not, however, explain the failure
of earlier propositions, which only one party opposed.
Thus, Stephanopoulos’ theory—that the legislative-majority
party’s vigorous opposition to the measure is the most significant
factor in the failure of a proposition—seems to explain best the
failure of Proposition 11’s predecessors.
The lack of such
opposition also best explains Proposition 11’s subsequent success.
This was the first redistricting proposition not to face concerted
opposition from the majority party, and it was the first such
proposition to succeed.

167 Nicholas D. Mosich, Note, Judging the Three-Judge Panel: An Evaluation of
California’s Proposed Redistricting Commission, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 165, 198–99 (2005).
168 Id. at 198.
169 See supra Table 2.
170 Mark DiCamillo & Mervin Field, New Record Low Job Ratings for Both
Schwarzenegger and the State Legislature, FIELD POLL, Oct. 13, 2009, at 2,
http://www.field.com/fieldpollonline/subscribers/R1s2315.pdf.
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III. COMPETITIVENESS: IS IT DESIRABLE?
Supporters of Proposition 11 promised one result:
competitive elections. But, are competitive elections desirable?
Even if they are, are they attainable in California? These are the
questions that the next two sections explore.
To sell Proposition 11 to the voters, its proponents
maintained that it would increase electoral competitiveness.171
Governor Schwarzenegger, the proposition’s top contributor and
fundraiser and highest-profile proponent, charged that “the
current redistricting system . . . insulates lawmakers from
competitive general elections.”172
Similarly, Democrat and
former-Controller Steve Westly assured the public that the
proposition would create more competitive election districts.173
But the “competitiveness” drumbeat did not stop there. Others
who touted the proposition’s ability to increase competitiveness
included redistricting experts,174 a non-profit organization,175 and
several newspaper editorial boards.176
Despite this focus on competitiveness in the 2008 campaign,
no discussion arose concerning the merits of competitiveness.
Several commentators have pushed for redistricting reform to
enhance competition in general elections. They have raised three
main benefits of greater competitiveness: increased electoral
participation, election of moderate legislators, and greater
responsiveness of those legislators to the needs of their
constituents.
171 Interestingly, the initiative does not actually require that the redistricting
commission draw competitive districts. Proposition 11 delineates multiple standards for
redrawing maps, see supra text accompanying note 132, but it does not include
competitiveness among these requirements.
172 Steven Harmon, Governor Pivots to Campaign Mode, STATEWIDE DATABASE (Sept.
24,
2008),
http://swdb.berkeley.edu/resources/Redistricting_News/california/2008/
September/Governor_pivots_to_09_24-08.htm.
173 Bay City News Service, Schwarzenegger Stumps for Prop. 11, PALO ALTO ONLINE
(Oct. 24, 2008, 8:41 AM), http://www.paloaltoonline.com/news/show_story.php?id=9783.
174 Patrick McGreevy, Democrats Fall Short in Bid for a Super Majority, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 6, 2008, at B4 (quoting professor John J. Pitney of Claremont McKenna College as
saying, “[Proposition 11] will make more seats competitive”);; Stephanopoulos, A Fighting
Chance for Redistricting, supra note 32 (“What’s good about Proposition 11 is that it
would make California’s elections more competitive.”).
175 ACLU/SC Supports the California Voters FIRST Initiative on the November
Ballot, ACLU OF S. CAL. (June 18, 2008), http://www.aclu-sc.org/releases/view/102890.
176 See supra note 100 (citing references). See also Editorial, Let Citizens Redraw the
Map, DAILY BREEZE, Mar. 17, 2008, at 10A (“New plan to create competitive legislative
districts in California merits support.”);; Editorial, California Voters Should Support
Redistricting Ballot Measure, FRESNO BEE, Mar. 25, 2008, at C4 (“More competitive races
will make lawmakers more accountable.”);; Editorial, An Essential Reform, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIBUNE, Mar. 10, 2008, at B6 (“This is why it’s absolutely crucial to have as many
competitive legislative districts as possible.”).
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First, supporters maintain that greater competitiveness can
benefit the entire electoral process. Competitiveness increases
voter turnout rates.177 The political parties are sensitive to
competition and focus their limited resources where elections are
competitive.178 They target television advertising and other
mobilizing efforts mainly in competitive races,179 and studies
have found that persons contacted through mobilization efforts
are more likely to vote.180 Presumably, greater interest also
leads to more media attention, higher campaign contributions,
and a sense that one’s vote matters.181 Accordingly, the closer
the anticipated outcome of an election, the more voters become
involved182 and the better informed they are likely to be.183
Furthermore, competitive elections can affect participation even
after the election. For instance, after the 2000 presidential
election, voter registration drives surged.184 In addition to their
effect on voters, competitive elections are essential to other
aspects of the democratic process. For instance, they encourage
the appearance of strong challengers to majority-party
candidates, which also stimulates party mobilization and
campaign contributions.185
Proponents also maintain that more competitive districts can
yield more centrist candidates. Studies suggest that at the
individual district level “more competitive seats lead to more
moderate members and . . . ‘cross-pressured’ members are more
likely to have more centrist voting scores.”186 When districts are
not competitive, candidates know that voters in their districts are

177 Shelley de Alth, ID at the Polls: Assessing the Impact of Recent State Voter ID
Laws on Voter Turnout, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV 185, 192 (2009).
178 Michael P. McDonald, The Competitive Problem of Voter Turnout, WASH. POST
(Oct. 31, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/30/
AR2006103000712.html.
179 Id.
180 ROBERT HUCKFELDT ET AL., INFORMATION, ACTIVATION, AND ELECTORAL
COMPETITION IN THE 2002 CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 22, available at
http://psfaculty.ucdavis.edu/huckfeldt/website_revise060106.pdf.
181 See generally id. (exploring the correlation between voter engagement with an
issue and political competitiveness).
182 STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE & JOHN MARK HANSEN, MOBILIZATION, PARTICIPATION,
AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 180–81 (Bruce Nichols & Robert Miller eds., 1993).
183 Peter J. Jenkins, Comment, The Supreme Court's Confused Election Law
Jurisprudence: Should Competitiveness Matter?, 2007 BYU L. REV. 167, 171.
184 LORRAINE C. MINNITE, THE POLITICS OF VOTER FRAUD 18 (Mar. 5, 2007), available
at
http://www.projectvote.org/component/content/article/254-Voter%20Fraud/561-thepolitics-of-voter-fraud.html.
185 Richard H. Pildes, The Constitution and Political Competition, 30 NOVA L. REV
253, 260 (2006).
186 Walter M. Frank, Making Our Congressional Elections More Competitive; A
Proposal for a Limited Number of Statewide At-Large Elections in Our More Populous
States, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1425, 1427 (2006).
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unlikely to support challengers from the other party.187 This
enables candidates to be more attentive to those voters who cast
ballots in primary elections, who tend to be more partisan and
less moderate than voters in general elections. When they are
focused on this sort of voter, candidates are more likely to take
extreme positions instead of representing the political center.188
Thus, noncompetitive districts undermine centrists, who can win
competitive general elections but not primaries in heavilypartisan districts. Noncompetitive districts thus impact the
partisanship, and possibly the effectiveness, of legislatures.189 Of
course, the hope of many supporters of competitive districts is
that an increase in centrist legislators will reduce both
partisanship and gridlock in legislatures.190
Competitive districts may also increase the accountability of
legislators to the voters.191 Districts that are competitive compel
legislators to respect the interests of their constituents or face a
realistic chance of defeat.192
Furthermore, districts with
competitive
elections
prevent
parties
from
becoming
overwhelmingly dominant in geographic areas and lacking
incentives to compete for voters.193 Some commentators consider
accountability to be the central purpose of elections.194 Others
consider it to have a constitutional basis or to function as part of
the checks and balances fundamental to the Constitution.195
Another aspect of accountability regards corruption of elected
officials. One study found that in the 1980s, among candidates

Jenkins, supra note 183, at 170–71.
Id. at 171.
Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119
HARV. L. REV 2311, 2380 (2006). See Larry Alexander & Saikrishna B. Prakash, Tempest
in an Empty Teapot: Why the Constitution Does Not Regulate Gerrymandering, 50 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1, 13 (2008) (asserting that the replacement of centrist legislators with
extremists produces polarized, factious, and inefficient legislatures).
190 See Alexander & Prakash, supra note 189, at 2381.
191 Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593,
629 (2002). However, some results suggest that a lack of electoral competition actually
increases the responsiveness of legislators. BENJAMIN G. BISHIN, COMPETITION AND THE
CONGRESSIONAL REPRESENTATION: ARE THE BENEFITS OF COMPETITIVE ELECTIONS
OVERSTATED? 27, available at http://moya.bus.miami.edu/~bbishin/ccr.pdf.
192 Timothy P. Brennan, Note, Cleaning Out the Augean Stables: Pennsylvania's Most
Recent Redistricting and a Call to Clean Up This Messy Process, 13 WIDENER L.J. 235,
338 (2003).
193 Pildes, supra note 185, at 260.
194 Richard
Briffault, Defining the Constitutional Question in Partisan
Gerrymandering, 14 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 397, 411 (2005).
195 See Pildes, supra note 185, at 265–66 (arguing that the Elections Clause prohibits
the self-interested manipulation in the creation of overwhelmingly safe and
noncompetitive districts that destroy electoral accountability); Brennan, supra note 192,
at 337 (asserting that the Founders believed that legislators should be accountable to the
people, which was the most essential Constitutional check on the government).
187
188
189
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charged with corruption, only 3.8% percent lost in primaries,
while their loss rate in the general election was 25%.196
Defenders of noncompetitive districts, however, point to
several valuable functions they provide.
They argue that
noncompetitive districts provide better representation for their
voters and promote stability of the Legislature. They also
maintain that competitive elections, rather than inspiring
crossover appeals, actually lead to “getting out the base” efforts.
Critics point out that, by definition, competitive districts
leave more voters unrepresented. A major drawback of singlemember districts is that the votes for the losing candidate are
“wasted.”197 Closely-balanced districts therefore maximize the
number of wasted votes.198 A district that is less competitive in
general elections forces candidates to take positions more akin to
those of the typical voter of the district; thus legislators elected
from homogenous districts will be more representative of more of
the district’s voters.199 Furthermore, from the perspective of
voter satisfaction, competitive elections are less desirable.
Unlike with sporting events, when it comes to elections voters
prefer blowouts (large victory margins) to exciting finishes
(competitive contests).200 Voters also prefer to have
representatives with similar ideologies over having closelycontested general elections.201 As an additional psychological
benefit, voters give Congress higher approval ratings when likeminded persons represent their districts.202
Thus, noncompetitive districts may maximize voter satisfaction.203
Another advantage pointed to by commentators is that
noncompetitive districts increase the stability of the Legislature
as a whole. With more competitive districts, partisan control of
the Legislature would change more frequently.204 Thus, slight
196 Matthew G. Jarvis, Competition is Good: Side-Benefits of Competitive Districts
14–15 (Aug. 28–31, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, prepared for presentation at the 2008
Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association), available at
http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/7/9/2/7/pages279276/p2
79276-1.php.
197 Brunell, supra note 10, at 46.
198 Id.
199 Thomas I. Brunell & Justin Buchler, Ideological Representation and Competitive
Congressional Elections, 28 ELECTORAL STUD. 448, 449 (2009).
200 Id. at 455. On the other hand, the satisfaction of voters who supported losing
candidates is not related to the margin of defeat. Id. at 456.
201 Id.
202 Id. at 454.
203 This may explain the finding that turnout rates are curvilinear—while the most
competitive counties have the highest turnout rates, so too do the least competitive
counties. DAVID E. CAMPBELL, WHY WE VOTE: HOW SCHOOLS AND COMMUNITIES SHAPE
OUR CIVIC LIFE 34 (2006).
204 HUCKFELDT ET AL., supra note 180, at 22.
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changes in voter preferences would shift control of the
Legislature.205 At the extremes of competitiveness, a statewide
vote of only fifty-one or fifty-two percent in favor of a party might
shift control in the Legislature.206 Because of legal207 and
geographic constraints,208 no districting plan for California will
have all hyper-competitive districts. Nevertheless, the risk of
shifts in partisan control remains.209
Opponents of competitiveness also argue that high levels of
competition can adversely affect individual officeholders and
candidates.
Candidates would likely be less interested in
running for office if they knew that slight changes in political
sentiment would remove them from office. Thus, less competitive
districts can be more appealing to prospective candidates because
greater stability makes the possibility of a career in the
Legislature more likely.210 Conversely, competitive elections
deter candidates because of the foreseeable burden of
campaigning in future close elections.211 Incumbents who are
concerned about upcoming competitive elections have greater
incentives to steer pork barrel projects to their districts in
attempts to “buy off” their constituents.212 Similarly, they are
more likely to focus on parochial issues rather than on those of
benefit to the larger whole, be it a region, state, or nation.213

205 Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judicial
Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARV. L. REV. 649, 668 (2002).
See also Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 359 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing
the fact that in a large state with mere random redistricting, a shift from fifty-one percent
Republican to forty-nine percent Republican could yield a “seismic shift” in the
composition of the legislature from one hundred percent Republican to one hundred
percent Democrat).
206 Daniel H. Lowenstein & Jonathan Steinberg, The Quest for Legislative Districting
in the Public Interest: Elusive or Illusory?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1, 39–40 (1985).
207 See infra text accompanying notes 219–232.
208 See infra text accompanying notes 233–256.
209 Possibly a more likely concern in California is that a large number of competitive
districts could result in significantly disproportional representation. Non-proportional
legislatures are likely where excessive numbers of districts are competitive. Brunell,
supra note 10, at 75.
210 See Sally Dworak-Fisher, Note, Drawing the Line on Incumbency Protection, 2
MICH. J. RACE & L. 131, 137 (1996). See also Thomas Brunell, When Competition Is Bad
for Voters and Democracy, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (June 3, 2008, 9:07 AM),
http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/dn/opinion/viewpoints/stories/DNbrunell_03edi.ART.State.Edition1.45fe223.html (asserting that a district that is less
competitive in general elections is more attractive to strong candidates of the majority
party to run in the primary).
211 Daniel R. Ortiz, Federalism, Reapportionment, and Incumbency: Leading the
Legislature to Police Itself, 4 J. L. & Pol. 653, 683 (1988).
212 Recent Developments, Independent Redistricting Commissions, 43 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 535, 543 (2006).
213 Justin Buchler, Competition, Representation and Redistricting: The Case Against
Competitive Congressional Districts, 17 J. THEORETICAL POL. 431, 461 (2005).
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Critics also charge that competitive districts may rely upon a
premise that is not always applicable. Proponents argue that
competitive districts will force candidates to take less extreme
positions.214 Candidates, however, do not always follow this
strategy. For instance, after the 2000 presidential election, in
which George W. Bush lost the popular vote but won the electoral
college vote by 271 to 266,215 President Bush did not focus on
winning swing voters. Instead of targeting moderate voters, his
reelection campaign focused on mobilizing his own party’s
voters.216 Since the majority of “independent” voters are not
truly swing voters but actually favor one party,217 the drawing of
competitive districts may not force candidates to broaden their
appeal. Instead, such districts may actually heighten partisan
appeals.218
While the virtues of competitiveness are more intuitive, a
lack of competitiveness may be beneficial. This is reassuring,
since Proposition 11 is unlikely to accomplish its goal of
increasing competition.

See supra notes 186–190 and accompanying text.
David Leip, 2000 Presidential General Election Results, ATLAS OF U.S.
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, http://www.uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/national.php?year=
2000&off=0&elect=0&f=0 (last visited Oct. 24, 2010).
216 Ronald Brownstein, The Race to the White House: Bush Aims to Solidify His Base,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2004, at A1. This strategy did not begin with President Bush;
parties have utilized it since the earliest days of the union. Samuel Issacharoff, Collateral
Damage: The Endangered Center in American Politics, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 415, 426
(2004).
217 Tom Jacobs, ‘Independent’ Voters Are Generally Not, MILLER-MCCUNE (July 28,
2009), http://www.miller-mccune.com/politics/independent-voters-are-generally-not-3560/.
According to Tom Jensen, communications director of Public Policy Polling, “two-thirds of
independent voters are not swing voters.” Id. Conventional political science wisdom holds
that “independents” who acknowledge that they “lean” toward one party actually behave
like closet partisans. They are politically active and interested and loyal to the party to
which they lean. Eric McGhee & Daniel Krimm, Party Registration and the Geography of
Party Polarization, 41 POLITY 345, 359 (2009).
218 Furthermore,
a study of Congressional polarization concluded that
gerrymandering explains little if any of the polarization apparent in Congress. Nolan
McCarty et al., Does Gerrymandering Cause Polarization? 5 (Oct. 23, 2006), available at
http://www.princeton.edu/~nmccarty/gerrymander11.pdf. Indeed, the authors found that
legislative polarization is consistent with the general geographic polarization of voters
along ideological and partisan lines. Id. at 4. Masket, Winburn, and Wright found that
representatives elected from legislatively-drawn districts are actually less polarized than
members of Congress whose districts were drawn by a non-legislative body. Seth Masket
et al., The Limits of the Gerrymander: Examining the Impact of Redistricting on Electoral
Competition and Legislative Polarization 20 (Aug. 31–Sept. 3, 2006) (unpublished paper
presented at annual meeting of American Political Science Association), available at
http://www.votelaw.com/blog/blogdocs/Limits%20of%20the%20gerrymander.pdf. Another
study found that, while redistricting was a factor in polarization, the U.S. Senate, which
does not undergo redistricting, and the House had become polarized concurrently. Sean
M. Theriault, The Case of the Vanishing Moderates: Party Polarization in the Modern
Congress 19 (2004), available at http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_
citation/0/8/3/2/6/pages83269/p83269-19.php.
214
215
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IV. NON-COMPETITIVE ELECTIONS: MIGHT SOMETHING BESIDES
REDISTRICTING CAUSE THEM?
Whether or not competitiveness is desirable, legislative
elections in California have experienced a marked competitive
decline,219 and supporters of Proposition 11 have insisted that
legislative redistricting is the cause. A more careful study of
applicable legal requirements and geographic considerations,
however, indicates that Proposition 11 is unlikely to increase
competitiveness significantly.
As previously discussed, federal and state laws constrain the
drawing of legislative districts. Line drawers must populate the
districts equally,220 and they must not dilute minority voting
strength.221 California law also imposes additional mandatory
(contiguity)222 and nonmandatory (respect for jurisdictional
boundaries)223 requirements.
The combination of these
constraints, however, limits the ability of redistricters to draw
more competitive districts.
Bruce Cain, Karin Mac Donald, and Iris Hui examined the
impact of legal criteria on the drawing of competitive districts.224
They noted a truism of redistricting: the imposition of multiple
criteria will “highly constrain” the accomplishment of any single
goal.
In other words, mandating more than one criteria
necessarily will require trade-offs among criteria.225 Compliance
with the Voting Rights Act, for instance, necessitates avoiding
both minority vote dilution and retrogression of minority voting

219 See supra Figure 2. Although the competitiveness of California’s districts has
declined, this is not solely a California phenomenon. Analysis of congressional elections
reveals that victory margins for incumbents have been rising nationwide since the early
1990s (for open seats, election margins during the period have fluctuated). Legislative
control of redistricting has not correlated to higher victory margins. Masket et al., supra
note 218, at 14.
220 See supra notes 8–13, 27 and accompanying text.
221 See supra notes 14–26 and accompanying text.
222 See supra note 28.
223 See supra note 29.
224 See generally BRUCE E. CAIN, KARIN MAC DONALD & IRIS HUI, INSTITUTE FOR
GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, COMPETITION AND REDISTRICTING IN CALIFORNIA: LESSONS FOR
REFORM (2006). Specifically, they instructed a team of mappers to draw demonstrative
assembly district plans for California. As part of this experiment, they “switched on or
off” particular redistricting constraints to determine their effects on the drawing of
districts for California. These particular requirements were: (1) compliance with the
Voting Rights Act; (2) minimizing the splitting of subjurisdictions; and (3) enhancing
competitiveness. They began by drawing “random-box” plans (using only Census
population data) to establish benchmarks from which the effect of adding a particular
constraint could be measured. Then, they instructed the mappers to add one of the
constraints in separate plans. Finally, they instructed them to draw maps incorporating
all three criteria. Id. at 22.
225 Id. at 5.
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strength.226
Since African Americans and Latinos are
predominantly Democratic, the legally-mandated majorityminority districts are usually heavily-Democratic and
intentionally noncompetitive in general elections (so the minority
population can elect its candidate of choice).227 Conversely, since
these districts require the inclusion of large concentrations of
Democratic voters, they deplete the pool of Democratic voters for
surrounding
districts,
thereby
facilitating—or
even
necessitating—the drawing of safe Republican districts.228
Thus, the Voting Rights Act requirements have significant
redistricting consequences. The Voting Rights Act reduces
competitiveness not only by altering the configuration of
districts, but also by reducing the pool of districts available for
competition. In California, Cain et al. found that minority
populations have been dispersing geographically.229 As a result,
to satisfy the Voting Rights Act standards, map drawers need to
extend districts to encompass pockets of ethnic communities.230
This constrains their options when populating surrounding
districts. Moreover, states that must satisfy the section 5 nonretrogression requirement typically have fewer marginal districts
and fewer districts with two major-party candidates.231
Consequently, preserving minority voting strength often occurs
at the direct expense of electoral competitiveness.232
Another factor that explains the decline in competitiveness is
population redistribution. During the past two decades, our
population has realigned itself geographically along political
lines. Bill Bishop labels this phenomenon as “The Big Sort.”233
As a result, regions, states, and counties now are much more
politically homogenous than they were just three decades ago.234

See supra notes 14–26 and accompanying text.
Lublin & McDonald, supra note 34, at 147.
Bruce I. Oppenheimer, Deep Red and Blue Congressional Districts: The Causes
and Consequences of Declining Party Competitiveness, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 135,
152 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 8th ed. 2005).
229 See Lublin & McDonald, supra note 34, at 147.
230 CAIN ET AL., supra note 224, at 24.
231 Lublin & McDonald, supra note 34, at 155.
232 CAIN ET AL., supra note 224, at 24.
Similarly, because of the unusual
configurations of many city and county boundaries, respecting those lines also
significantly constrains competitiveness. Id. at 26. While this is not a mandatory
standard that redistricters must follow, the California Constitution nonetheless does
require that the geographic integrity of cities and counties be respected to the greatest
extent possible without violating other requirements. CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(d)(3).
233 BILL BISHOP, THE BIG SORT 42 (2008).
234 Id.
226
227
228
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This sorting is possible because we have a highly mobile
population. For instance, in 2008, 11 million Americans moved
to a different county.235 While the population of the United
States has always exhibited a high rate of mobility, the nature of
this movement has changed in recent decades.236 Beginning in
the 1970s and 1980s, when people moved, they tended to relocate
to areas where most residents held similar political
perspectives.237 In general, when people select a locale in which
to live, they choose where to live within that locale based upon
factors that correlate with partisan preferences.238 These factors
include immigration, education, income, and religion.239 Thus,
Democrats began moving to Democrat-majority counties and
Republicans to Republican counties. Similarly, as Democrats left
Republican areas, Republicans were more likely to replace them,
and vice versa.240 This trend differed markedly from the racial
consequences of these movements. From 1980 to 2000, American
counties became slightly less segregated, whereas during the
same period, the segregation of Republicans and Democrats
increased by almost twenty-six percent.241
Within California, these shifts are readily apparent. The
1976 and 2004 presidential elections provide good points for
comparison. Both races were very closely contested at the
national level. In 1976, Jimmy Carter prevailed over Gerald
Ford by a popular vote margin nationwide of 2.1% (50.1% to
48.0%); in 2004, George W. Bush defeated John Kerry by a
similar margin of 2.4% (50.7% to 48.3%).242 During the twentyeight years between these elections, forty-seven of California’s

235 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TABLE 1: GENERAL MOBILITY, BY RACE AND HISPANIC
ORIGIN, REGION, SEX, AGE, RELATIONSHIP TO HOUSEHOLDER, EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT,
MARITAL STATUS, NATIVITY, TENURE, AND POVERTY STATUS: 2008 TO 2009,
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/migrate/cps2009.html (follow excel for
United States Table 1). At the same time, another twenty-five million persons moved
within the same county. Id. In addition to population mobility, population growth has
been the other major cause of California’s political redistribution. JAMES G. GIMPEL &
JASON E. SCHUKNECHT, PATCHWORK NATION: SECTIONALISM AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN
AMERICAN POLITICS 76 (2004).
236 Oppenheimer, supra note 228, at 152–53.
237 Id.
238 Oppenheimer, supra note 228, at 153.
239 Alan I. Abramowitz et al., Don’t Blame Redistricting for Uncompetitive Elections,
39 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 87, 88 (2006).
240 BISHOP, supra note 233, at 44.
241 Id. at 10.
242 David
Leip,
ATLAS
OF
U.S.
PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS,
http://www.uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/national.php?year=2000&off=0&elect=0&f=0
(last visited Oct. 24, 2010).
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fifty-eight counties (81%) became more partisan. Specifically,
seventeen counties (29.3%) became more Democratic while thirty
(51.7%) became more Republican.243 Only eleven (20.0%) became
more closely contested.244
Three counties provide especially illuminating illustrations
of this shift: San Francisco,245 Los Angeles, and Kern. San
Francisco is an example of an area that became increasingly
partisan during this period despite a stable overall population
size. Figure 5 charts the Democratic and Republican votes in
presidential general elections in San Francisco:
FIGURE 5246
Presidential General Election - San Francisco County
1948-2008
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For the first three elections, San Francisco leaned slightly
toward the Republicans.
However, starting in 1960, the
Democratic candidate won the county, and Democrats have won
every presidential general election since then. Starting in 1976,
the Democratic margin of victory has increased from the previous
elections, with the sole exception being in 1996. By 2008, the
Republican candidate (McCain) garnered only 13.6% of San

BISHOP, supra note 233, at 44.
Id.
The California legislature consolidated the city and county of San Francisco in
1856. Percy v. Long, Consolidated City and County Government of San Francisco, 8 PROC.
OF THE AM. POL. SCI. ASS’N 109, 109 (1912). It is the only consolidated city and county in
California. Id. at 110.
246 CALIFORNIA
SECRETARY
OF
STATE,
Statewide
Election
Results,
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/elections_elections.htm; Leip, supra note 242.
243
244
245
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Francisco’s vote.247
Those familiar with San Francisco’s
geography will know that this shift in partisanship did not result
from population growth (there is nowhere to add population). In
fact, between 1960 and 2000, the total population in San
Francisco County increased by just 4.9%; during this period, the
statewide population increased by 115.5%.248 Thus, this change
must have resulted from geographic sorting; specifically, an
influx of Democrats and outflow of Republicans.
Neighboring counties Los Angeles and Kern provide striking
examples of the divergence of growing populations, as one
neighbor broke Democratic while the other Republican. Figures
6 and 7 chart these results:
FIGURE 6249

See Leip, supra note 242.
See California Historic & Projected Growth 1790 to 2030, NEGATIVE
POPULATION GROWTH, http://www.npg.org/states/ca.htm; San Francisco Population,
SFGENEOLOGY.COM, http://www.sfgenealogy.com/sf/history/hgpop.htm.
249 CALIFORNIA
SECRETARY
OF
STATE,
Statewide
Election
Results,
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/elections_elections.htm; Leip, supra note 242.
247
248
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FIGURE 7250

From 1948 until 1984, Los Angeles County oscillated
between supporting Republican and Democratic presidential
candidates. Then, in 1988 it supported the Democratic nominee,
and it has continued to do so since then by increasing margins.
In Kern County, support for Democratic and Republican
nominees stayed fairly close through 1976. Then, as in Los
Angeles, the margin of support started to diverge, but in this
instance in favor of Republicans.
Moreover, unlike San
Francisco, which had a relatively stable population from 1960
through 2000, both Los Angeles and Kern experienced significant
growth. During this period, Los Angeles grew by 57.6%, while
Kern grew by 126.6%.251
This analysis focused on the trends evident in particular
counties. The effects of this sorting are apparent, however,
throughout the state. Beginning in 1948, sixteen general election
contests (excluding propositions) had extremely close votes
statewide; the final margins between the top two candidates were
less than two percentage points.252 These close statewide results,
however, mask the sorting occurring at the local level. Figure 8
250 CALIFORNIA
SECRETARY
OF
STATE,
Statewide
Election
Results,
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/elections_elections.htm; Leip, supra note 242.
251 Los
Angeles
County
Population
Growth,
CENSUSSCOPE,
http://www.censusscope.org/us/s6/c37/chart_popl.html; Kern County Population Growth,
CENSUSSCOPE, http://www.censusscope.org/us/s6/c29/chart_popl.html.
252 The Appendix lists these specific elections and the distribution of votes by county
by margin of victory.
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presents the average percentage of votes cast by decade in
landslide and “toss-up” counties in these narrowly-decided
statewide elections:253
FIGURE 8254
Percent of Votes, Tossup and Landslide (>20%) Counties,
1948–2010
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Figure 8 illustrates the diverging trends in California. In
the 1940s, 73.5% of California’s votes were cast in counties in
which the statewide vote differential between the top two
candidates was less than two percentage points. Only 9.9% of
the vote came from counties decided by landslide margins—at
least twenty percentage points.
Thus, three-quarters of
Californians lived in counties with nearly equal populations of
Democrats and Republicans. Starting in the 1980s, however, in
these narrow statewide elections more Californians cast their
votes in landslide counties than in toss-up counties. This trend
has continued, so that in the 2000s less than ten percent of the
votes came from toss-up counties, while more than one-quarter
were cast in landslide counties.
Although the analysis of twenty percent landslide counties
demonstrates the growth of politically extreme counties, political
scientists recognize that a differential of ten percent or less
defines marginal contests.255 Thus, we could use ten percent as
253 A “landslide” election refers to a contest in which the winner receives at least sixty
percent of the vote. ALLAN J. LICHTMAN, THE KEYS TO THE WHITE HOUSE: A SUREFIRE
GUIDE TO PREDICTING THE NEXT PRESIDENT 26 (2000). A “toss-up” election is an election
in which the winning candidate prevails by less than five percent of the total vote.
254 See infra Appendix & note 353.
255 James E. Campbell, The Stagnation of Congressional Elections, in LIFE AFTER
REFORM: WHEN THE BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM ACT MEETS POLITICS 141, 142
(Michael J. Malbin ed., 2003).
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the cutoff to examine noncompetitive counties. When we do so,
we see some interesting changes:
FIGURE 9256
Percent of Votes, Tossup and Noncompetitive (>10%)
Counties, 1948–2010
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Not surprisingly, more voters live in ten percent
noncompetitive counties than live in twenty percent landslide
counties. Accordingly, the votes in noncompetitive counties
basically draw even with the votes in toss-up counties by the
1960s and 1970s. The main difference, though, between Figures
8 and 9 is the magnitude in jump after the 1970s in the
population in noncompetitive counties. By the 2000s, nearly
ninety percent of votes in a statewide toss-up election were cast
by voters who lived in counties decided by at least ten percent, or
noncompetitive margins. Conversely, less than ten percent of the
state’s voters lived in marginally competitive counties, even
when the election was a toss-up.
These changes probably did not result solely from population
movement. It is more likely that group dynamics pushed group
members to greater extremes as one group or another became
dominant in a county.257
Sociologists have studied group
dynamics and the effects of group homogeneity on behavior.
They have found that heterogeneous groups tend to be more
moderate; the differences within the group restrain group
excesses.258 Groups of homogenous persons, conversely, tend to

256
257
258

See infra Appendix & note 353.
BISHOP, supra note 233, at 68.
Id.
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move toward polarization.259
Group polarization occurs as
homogenous groups discuss issues. Over time group members
predictably move and coalesce, not toward a middle position, but
toward a more extreme position than that held by the members
initially.260 Continued dialog actually decreases variance among
members and produces convergence on a relatively more extreme
position.261 This result occurs for two reasons. First, individuals
seek acceptance, and so they adjust their position to conform to
the dominant perspective of the group.262 Second, with a
relatively homogenous group, contrary positions are rarely
considered, so the dominant perspective naturally becomes more
convincing.263
Pervasive evidence demonstrates that group polarization
theory extends to issues that bear directly on politics and
political behavior.264
When applied to political dynamics,
homogeneous groups similarly become self-reinforcing.
For
instance, in landslide counties, political minorities participate
less throughout the political process, from volunteering to
voting.265 As minorities retreat, the majority gains confidence in
its positions and becomes more extreme.266
What are the implications of this population sorting for
California’s redistricting reform?
Critics of legislative redistricting charge that the Legislature draws noncompetitive
districts that favor one party over the other.267 This is a
comforting hypothesis since it provides a readily-curable cause:
legislators redrawing their own lines and thus choosing their
voters, for an effect: the rise in noncompetitive districts. Even
better, not only does it have a cause, it identifies the “bad guys”
who perpetrated it, and what better bad guys could one suggest

259 “Polarization,” in this context, occurs when the tendency of individual members of
a group to lean toward a given position is enhanced after discussion or other exchanges.
As a result, groups often make more extreme decisions than would the typical average
individual in the group. Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to
Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 85 (2000) [hereinafter Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble?].
260 Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Group Polarization 9 (John M. Olin Law & Econ.,
Working Paper No. 91, 1999) [hereinafter Sunstein, The Law].
261 Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble?, supra note 259, at 85–86.
262 Id.
263 Sunstein, The Law, supra note 260, at 10.
264 Edward L. Glaeser & Cass R. Sunstein, Extremism and Social Learning, 1 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 263, 269 (2009).
265 BISHOP, supra note 233, at 73.
266 Id. at 77. Not only do group dynamics relate to the decline in competitiveness in
districts, they also help explain the rise in partisanship and the decline in moderation in
legislatures. Studies at the national level have found that members of Congress from all
regions have moved away from the center, and since the 1980s voters have become vastly
more partisan. Id. at 246, 253.
267 Id. at 28–29.
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than politicians?268 The hypothesis also has victims—besides the
electorate generally, the centrists who otherwise would send
moderate candidates to the Legislature.269 During the past two
decades, however, county lines—which have not changed—have
come to define highly-partisan enclaves. Although the line
drawers decide the final district configurations, geographies
underlying the districts have become more partisan anyway.
Blaming legislators for the lack of competition may be appealing,
but it ignores underlying realities.270
Other analyses confirm that the ability of line drawers to
create competitive districts in California is limited. Cain et al.
found that California’s geography constrains the ability to draw
competitive districts. When they instructed their map drawers to
develop their random box plans (applying only equal population
and compactness as constraints), fifty-three of the eighty
assembly seats (66.3%) were unlikely to be even potentially
competitive.271 In other words, before taking into account any
other criteria, which will necessarily reduce competition further,
two-thirds of California’s assembly districts will be
noncompetitive.272
The Center for Governmental Studies (Center), which helped
to draft Proposition 11 and which supported the measure,
acknowledged that increasing competition in California would be
difficult.273 In addition to the concentrations of urban Democrats,
Republicans predominate in large regions of the state, notably
the Central Valley and much of Orange and Riverside
Counties.274 The Center noted that imposing competitiveness as
a redistricting criterion would require stretching districts from
areas dominated by one party to those controlled by the other
party.275 Even if this were possible, such practices likely would
violate other considerations, such as the compactness of districts

Id. at 29.
Levinson & Pildes, supra note 189, at 2380.
BISHOP, supra note 233, at 29.
CAIN ET AL., supra note 224, at 16–17. For these plans, they instructed their map
drawers to ignore all other federal and state criteria. The map drawers constructed four
plans, and Cain et al. averaged the results of these plans. Id.
272 The “random box” plans also illustrate another consequence of California’s
geography. Because of the large urban concentrations of Democrats in the San Francisco
and Los Angeles metropolitan areas, anything other than a heavily-biased Republican
gerrymander will result in a Democratic majority. Id. at 4. For instance, of the fifty-three
safe assembly districts in the “random box” plans, forty (75.5%) were safe Democratic
seats. Id. at 13. These safe-Democratic districts constitute half of the Assembly’s eighty
districts.
273 CENTER FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, supra note 127, at 27.
274 Id.
275 Id.
268
269
270
271
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and the preservation of subjurisdictions and communities of
interest.276
Plotting results from the recent statewide election shows the
problem that this sorting creates for drawing competitive
districts in California. The 2010 contest for state controller was
decided by less than one percentage point. Specifically, Harris,
the Democratic candidate, defeated Cooley, the Republican
candidate, by 0.6% of the vote. The results of this election,
presented graphically in Figure 10, illustrate the geographic
separation in California.
FIGURE 10277

276 Cain et al. required their mappers to draw “fully balanced” plans which considered
equal population, the Voting Rights Act, compactness, minimizing subjurisdictional splits,
and maximizing the number of potentially competitive districts. This reduced the number
of potentially competitive districts from an average of seventeen in their “random box”
plans to fifteen in their “fully balanced” plans. CAIN ET AL., supra note 224, at 16–18.
However, they define competitiveness as a thirteen-point range in voter registration, from
a three percent Republican advantage to a ten percent Republican advantage. If the
range is considered to be only three percent Republican or Democratic advantage, then
the number of competitive districts falls to seven. Id. at 19. Even these numbers are not
absolutes. Cain et al. acknowledged that these plans were not sufficiently legally polished
to submit as actual proposals and that additional modifications might be necessary. Id. at
24–25.
277 CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE: 2002 CONTROLLER (2002)
[hereinafter STATEMENT OF VOTE: CONTROLLER 2002], available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/
elections/sov/2008_general/sov_complete.pdf.
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Figure 10 illustrates that one continuous bloc of counties
supported the Democratic candidate, while another bloc
supported the Republican candidate. Of California’s fifty-eight
counties, only three (Alpine, Imperial, and Los Angeles) were not
part of one of these two blocs. In the thirty-nine contiguous
counties that supported Cooley, he won by a combined margin of
18.6% of the vote. In the sixteen contiguous counties that
supported Harris, the Democrat won by a combined differential
of 26.4%; in the three noncontiguous counties, her combined
margin was 14.1%.278 Furthermore, only seven of the state’s
counties were marginally competitive (differential between the
top two candidates of less than ten percent). These seven
counties accounted for only 7.7% of the state’s total votes.279
This analysis illustrates the difficulty that line drawers will
have in crafting competitive districts. Because of the geographic
sorting that has occurred, most areas in California are highly
partisan. Redistricters can draw competitive districts only by
crossing city and county lines to combine different types of
communities.280 In areas of political segregation, no commission
can draw competitive districts.281
Furthermore, the
requirements of the Voting Rights Act will further constrain the
commission’s ability to draw competitive districts. Thus, the
commission can fulfill the promises of Proposition 11’s supporters
only by violating the only standards that the measure actually
articulates.
V. NONCOMPETITIVENESS: CAN REDISTRICTERS PROVIDE
THE CURE?
The competitiveness of districts has declined, but geographic
patterns appear to play a major role in this development. Can a
change in the persons redrawing the lines alter this outcome?
To determine whether commission-controlled redistricting
enhances competitiveness, Jamie Carson and Michael H. Crespin
analyzed the results from the four Congressional redistricting
cycles occurring between 1972 and 2002.282 Carson and Crespin
concluded that legislative redistricting is more likely to lead to
Id.
Id.
Recent Developments, supra note 212, at 542.
281 Levinson & Pildes, supra note 189, at 2381.
282 See generally Jamie Carson & Michael H. Crespin, Comparing the Effects of
Legislative, Commission, and Judicial Redistricting Plans on U.S. House Elections, 1972–
2002 (Mar. 11–13, 2004) (unpublished manuscript prepared for presentation at the
Western
Political
Science
Association
Annual
Meeting),
available
at
http://www.commoncause.org/atf/cf/%7BFB3C17E2-CDD1-4DF6-92BE-BD4429893665%
7D/PaperRedistrictingPoliticalCompetition.pdf.
278
279
280
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the creation of noncompetitive districts than other procedures.
Specifically, plans drawn by commissions, or the courts, tend to
produce a greater level of competition than legislative-drawn
plans.283 Seth Masket, Jonathan Winburn, and Gerald C. Wright
looked at the competitiveness of state legislative districts. They
found some evidence that legislative redistricting resulted in less
competitive elections when compared to elections in districts
drawn by neutral commissions, especially in contests involving
incumbents.284
Although Masket et al. found that legislative redistricting
created less competitive districts, another of their findings
reinforces the geographic sorting hypothesis. They examined the
difference in votes by assembly districts in presidential elections.
Figure 11 presents the average difference in vote by districts
from 1976 through 2004:
FIGURE 11285
AVERAGE DIFFERENCE IN PRESIDENTIAL VOTE
BY CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY DISTRICT
1976–2004

283 Id. at 22. Carson and Crespin further found, however, that partisan redistricting
strategies for Congressional seats depend upon the party’s standing in Congress. A party
not in control of Congress will tend to use more aggressive strategies in state
redistrictings in an attempt to take away seats from the other party. Parties in control of
Congress, however, are more likely to adopt conservative redistricting strategies to retain
control. Id. at 22–23. But, sometimes if a party cuts its margins too thin, these strategies
can backfire. For instance, in the 1980s, Indiana Republicans drew a plan that enabled
their party to convert a 6-5 Democratic delegation to a 6-4 Republican advantage in 1982;
by the end of the decade, the Democrats then reversed this to an 8-2 Democratic majority.
More recently, a plan by Georgia Democrats intended to capture 7 of 13 seats resulted in
securing only 5 seats. Lublin & McDonald, supra note 34, at 145.
284 Masket et al., supra note 218, at 17.
285 Id. at 38.
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Figure 11 confirms that the vote differential increased after
the legislative redistrictings of the 1980 and 2000 redistricting
cycles. On average, the increase was by slightly less than three
percent after the redistrictings. On the other hand, after the
judicial redistricting in 1992, the differential declined by
approximately one percent. The greatest change in differentials
occurred, however, not after redistricting, but during the middle
of the decades. In the 1970s, the differential increased by seven
percent; in the 1990s, it rose by five percent (and was essentially
flat during the 1980s).286 Alan I. Abramowitz, Brad Alexander,
and Matthew Gunning similarly found that “[t]he most
significant changes in competitiveness of [congressional contests]
occurred between redistricting cycles.”287 Since the greatest
decline in competitiveness occurred not after redistrictings, but
between them, this suggests that the geographic sorting
hypothesis better explains the decline.
Fortunately, two states, Arizona and Washington, already
require that their redistricting commissions consider
competitiveness in developing plans.288
If self-interested
redistricting, rather than geographic sorting, better explains the
decline in competitiveness, we should expect the districts in these
states to exhibit significantly greater competitiveness than those
in California—they do not.

Id.
Alan I. Abramowitz et al., Incumbency, Redistricting, and the Decline of
Competition in U.S. House Elections, 68 J. OF POL. 75, 79 (2006). Concerning the type of
line drawer, they found “no evidence that redistricting by nonpartisan redistricting
commissions or courts resulted in more competitive districts than redistricting by
partisan state legislatures.” The primary exception was California, in which marginal
congressional districts declined from fourteen to four. Id.
288 Two other states contemplated proposals to require competitive election districts.
In Colorado, State Senator Ken Gordon introduced a bill to add competitiveness to the
criteria that the legislature must use when it draws political boundaries. Eventually,
however, these provisions were removed from the bill. Redistricting, COMMONCAUSE,
http://www.commoncause.org/site/pp.asp?c=dkLNK1MQIwG&b=196481 (last visited Oct.
25, 2010). In November 2005, voters placed onto the Ohio ballot a proposition to reform
its redistricting process. State Issue 4: Amended Certified Ballot Language, OHIO
SECRETARY
OF
STATE,
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/elections/electResultsMain/
2005ElectionsResults/05-1108Issue4/State%20Issue%204%20Amended%20Certified%
20Ballot%20Language.aspx (last visited Oct. 25, 2010). This measure, Ballot Issue 4,
would have substituted judicial appointment of members in place of appointment by
elected officials. Id. More importantly, it would have required the commission to adopt
the legislative and congressional plans—including any submitted by the public—that
scored highest for competitiveness. Id. The measure lost, however, 30.3% to 69.7%. State
Issue 4: November 8, 2005, OHIO SECRETARY OF STATE, http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/
elections/electResultsMain/2005ElectionsResults/05-1108Issue4.aspx (last visited Oct. 25,
2010).
286
287
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Washington State had originally required its Legislature to
redraw the state’s districts.289 Of the first ten redistrictings after
statehood in 1889, however, the Legislature successfully
redistricted only four times; the remaining times, the lines were
redrawn by either the courts or voter initiatives.290 Therefore, in
1983, after the governor vetoed that decade’s redistricting bill,
the Washington Legislature proposed and the voters approved
Constitutional Amendment 74 to shift responsibility for
redrawing the lines to a bipartisan commission.291 Pursuant to
this amendment, the majority and minority leaders of the state
Legislature each appoint one commissioner, and those four
commissioners then appoint the remaining member.292 The
commission then submits its plans to the Legislature, which may
alter the lines, but only after approval from two-thirds of the
Legislature.293
As amended, Washington law delineates particular
standards for the commission to follow in redrawing the lines.
Washington law divides the state into forty-nine legislative
districts. Each district elects one state senator and two members
of the state house of representatives, who run for numbered
posts.294 Legislative districts must have equal population.295 In
addition, to the extent possible, districts should minimize splits
of subjurisdictions and be compact and contiguous.296 Finally,
the commission must “encourage electoral competition.”297
Much was made of the apparent success of the commission in
bringing change to the state’s congressional delegation. Indeed,
prior to the 1992 redistricting, the delegation’s members had
289 Redistricting
Facts,
WASH.
STATE
REDISTRICTING
COMM’N,
http://www.redistricting.wa.gov/pages/facts.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2010).
290 Herb Robinson, Still Political, But Better Than Before, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 19,
1990, at A8. The state had many colorful incidents in its history. Among labels applied to
parts of plans were the “Kiskaddon Pimple,” which described the addition of a single
Snohomish County precinct—which included an incumbent’s residence—into an otherwise
all-King County district defined by a straight boundary with the exception of the precinct,
and the “Rasmussen Stovepipe,” a narrow corridor connecting Democratic incumbent
senator Rasmussen’s home to the Republican Lakewood area. Neil Modie, Compromise Is
the Key in Political Redistricting, SEATTLE POST INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 19, 2001, at A7.
Another plan submitted by activists, which would have placed eight incumbents into a
single district was described as the “legislative equivalent of the Texas Chainsaw
Massacre.” Shelby Scates, Trying to Slay the Gerrymander, SEATTLE POST
INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 22, 1991, at F2.
291 David Ammons, Citizen Panel Will Redraw State’s Political Boundaries, SEATTLE
TIMES, Aug. 27, 1990, at D4.
292 WASH. CONST. art. II, § 43, cl. 2.
293 WASH. REV. CODE ANN, § 44.05.100(1)–(2) (West 2007).
294 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 44.05.090(4) (West 2007).
295 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 44.05.090(1) (West 2007).
296 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 44.05.090(2) (West 2007).
297 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 44.05.090(5) (West 2007).
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served an average of six terms in office. By 1994, the members
averaged two terms.298 Table 4 tracks the changes in the party
control of seats from the election, before the implementation of
the commission’s first plan to the present:
TABLE 4299
WASHINGTON CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION
1990–2010

1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010

Democrats Republicans
5
3
8
1
2
7
3
6
5
4
6
3
6
3
6
3
6
3
6
3
5
4

As Table 4 shows, in the first election under the 1992 plan,
Democrats won three new seats, two from Republicans and one
as a result of the state receiving an additional seat through
reapportionment. Two years later, the Republicans took six seats
from the Democrats.
Over the next three elections, the
Democrats won back four of those seats. Thus, during the five
elections under this plan, incumbents lost seven elections and
seats changed party hands twelve times.300 Elections under the
298 Louis Jacobson & Chris Cillizza, Taking Redistricting out of Lawmakers’ Hands,
NAT’L J., Mar. 10, 2001, at 728.
299 United
States Congressional Delegations from Washington, WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_congressional_delegations_from_Washington
(last visited Oct. 29, 2010).
300 A closer analysis suggests that the turnover occurring in the 1992 plan may have
resulted from national trends rather than any inherent competitiveness of the districts in
the plan. Eight of the twelve seats that changed party hands under the 1992 plan did so
in either the 1992 or 1994 elections. 1992 saw the defeat of Republican George H. W.
Bush by Democrat Bill Clinton; the following election involved “the Republican tidal wave
of 1994,” in which Republicans won more than fifty congressional seats, including that of
then-House Speaker Tom Foley of Washington. Rhodes Cook, Hamstrung by Health Care?
Two Ways to Lose a House Majority, U. VA. CENTER FOR POL. (Mar. 25, 2010),
http://www.centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/articles/frc2010032501/.
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2002 redistricting plan, however, were a different matter. Only
one seat changed parties under this plan.
Despite the use of a bipartisan commission that needed to
comply
with
a
specific
competitiveness
requirement,
Washington’s 2002 redistricting mirrored that of California.
Much like the “incumbent protection gerrymander” passed by the
California Legislature, the Washington bipartisan commission
developed its own “status-quo plan.”301 As one of the members of
the Redistricting Commission conceded, state legislative districts
“tended to become slightly more Democratic if two or all three of
their incumbent lawmakers were Democrats, and slightly more
Republican if two or three incumbents were Republican.”302 In
other words, the districts became less competitive.
An analysis of the Washington congressional and legislative
districts reveals the dearth of competition under its 2002 status
quo plan. Table 5 graphically presents the average margin of
victory in the districts that the commission drew:
TABLE 5303
AVERAGE MARGIN OF VICTORY, WASHINGTON
CONGRESSIONAL, STATE SENATE, AND STATE
REPRESENTATIVE DISTRICTS
1992–2010

1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
Average

U.S. Representative
19.8
16.8
17.4
28.1
23.8
26.0
28.7
29.1
31.4
20.2
24.6

State senator
23.0
34.7
31.6
47.2
40.8
54.6
30.3
44.3
43.0
40.8
40.8

State representative
29.2
34.8
31.1
43.0
35.8
42.2
36.8
48.2
37.7
35.7
38.4

301 David Ammons, Citizen Commission Approves a New Map of Congressional
Districts, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 2, 2002, B1.
302 Neil Modie,
Tale of 2 Legislators—and One District, SEATTLE POST
INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 22, 2002, at B6, available at http://www.seattlepi.com/local/55337_
redistrict22.shtml.
303 See
WASHINGTON
SECRETARY
OF
STATE,
Previous
Elections,
http://wei.secstate.wa.gov/osos/en/PreviousElections/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Jan.
7, 2011).

Do Not Delete

3/16/2011 4:50 PM

2011]

361

The Red and Blue Golden State

As Table 5 illustrates, from 1992 to 2008, the lowest average
margin of victory in an election in districts drawn by the
commission was almost 17%. In six of ten election cycles, the
average margin of victory in general elections for state senate
seats exceeded 40%. Overall, the average margins of victory
under the commission’s plans were 24.6% in congressional
contests, 40.8% in state senate races, and 38.4% in state
representative elections.
Because a large number of state senate and legislative
districts were so uncompetitive that candidates ran uncontested,
these contests skew the average victory margin upward.
Therefore, the next three charts present the distribution of
contests by range of margin of victory: less than five percent,
between five and ten percent, greater than ten percent, and
uncontested (no congressional races were uncontested):
FIGURE 12304
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FIGURE 13305
Distribution of Victory Margins - State Senate
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FIGURE 14306
Distribution of Victory Margins - State Representative
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These distributions also make apparent the increase in
uncontested (presumably extremely safe) seats after the January
2002 “status quo” plan. Furthermore, despite the imposition of a
competitiveness requirement, in seven of nine years for state
senator and six of nine years for state representative, the number

305
306

Id.
Id.
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of uncontested elections actually exceeded the number of toss-up
elections.
Arizona provides a second example of a state that includes a
competitiveness requirement. In 2000, Arizona voters approved
an initiative that mandated consideration of competitiveness as a
criterion for redistricting.307 The measure, Proposition 106,
mandates creation of a five-member Independent Redistricting
Commission (IRC) to perform the redistricting.
Arizona’s
Commission on Appellate Court Appointments nominates
candidates.308 The majority and minority leaders of the state
senate and house each then appoint one commissioner.309 Next,
the four commissioners appoint the fifth member, who serves as
the chair.310 No more than two members may be from the same
political party.311
The Arizona Constitution requires this
commission to redistrict the state’s congressional and legislative
districts.312
As amended, the Arizona Constitution requires the
commission to develop initial districts of equal population in a
grid-like pattern. In the next phase, the commission makes
adjustments as necessary to accommodate the six goals identified
by Proposition 106 (equal population, Voting Rights Act
compliance, compactness and contiguity, respect for communities
of interest, geographic features and jurisdiction boundaries, and
competitiveness).313
In the remaining two constitutionallymandated phases, the commission receives comments on its plan
and makes final adjustments.314
The commission’s approval of a final plan in 2002 sparked
litigation that did not conclude until a ruling by the Arizona
Supreme Court seven years later. Concerning competitiveness,
the Arizona Supreme Court concluded that the Arizona

307 Ronald J. Hansen, 2000 Redistricting Goal of Closer Elections Unmet, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC, Jul. 8, 2010, at A1.
308 ARIZ. CONST. art. 4, pt. 2, § 1(4)–(9).
309 Id.
310 Id.
311 ARIZ. CONST. art. 4, pt. 2, § 1(3).
312 ARIZ. CONST. art. 4, pt. 2, § 1(14). Although Arizona also uses districts to elect the
members of its state house, each district elects two representatives, the top two vote
getters. ARIZ. CONST. art. 4, pt. 2, § 1(1). Accordingly, elections for the state house are not
included in this analysis.
313 ARIZ. CONST. art. 4, pt. 2, § 1(14).
314 ARIZ. CONST. art. 4, pt. 2, § 1(14)–(16). Since Proposition 106 passed in 2000, the
commission has been formed and drawn districts only in conjunction with the post-2000
Census round of redistricting. Despite the terms of the constitutional mandate, the
commission did not actually adjust for competitiveness until after receiving comments.
Arizona Minority Coalition for Fair Redistricting v. Arizona Independent Redistricting
Comm’n, 208 P.3d 676, 681 (Ariz. 2009).
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Constitution, as amended by Proposition 106, required that the
IRC create “more competitive districts to the extent practicable
when doing so does not cause significant detriment to the other
goals.”315
Despite this goal of creating more competitive districts, the
chair of the IRC conceded that most Arizonans would consider
the commission’s work in this regard to be “an abject failure.”316
He elaborated, “If your goal is competitive districts, I don’t think
this helps you get down that road very far.”317 In an analysis of
the commission system, The Arizona Republic concluded that the
commission “failed to meet a primary goal of making legislative
elections more competitive.”318
Analyses of the elections in the IRC’s districts support these
conclusions and suggest again that geographic sorting cannot be
overcome, even when governing law specifically instructs map
drawers to do so. Despite the IRC’s charge to craft competitive
districts, the resulting districts were anything but. Table 6
illustrates the average margin of victory in the districts that the
commission drew:
TABLE 6319
AVERAGE MARGIN OF VICTORY,
ARIZONA CONGRESSIONAL AND STATE SENATE
DISTRICTS
2002–2010

2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
Average

U.S. representative State senator
26.8
64.8
40.1
62.3
26.8
40.1
22.7
44.2
18.0
46.6
26.9
51.6

Table 6 shows that the average margin of victory in districts
drawn by the IRC approached thirty percent. Specifically, the
average victory margin in general elections in congressional
districts was 26.9%. For state senate contests, Table 6 shows
Arizona Minority Coalition, 208 P.3d at 687.
Hansen, supra note 307.
Eli Rosenbaum, Redistrict Reform’s Dead End, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 2005, at A23.
Hansen, supra note 307.
See
Previous
Arizona
Elections,
ARIZONA
SECRETARY
OF
STATE,
http://www.azsos.gov/election/PreviousYears.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2011).
315
316
317
318
319
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that the average margin of victory was 51.6%.
As with the Washington legislative elections, the large
number of uncontested seats distorts these numbers. Therefore,
Figures 15 and 16 reflect the ranges in which these contests fell:
FIGURE 15320
Distribution of Victory Margins - U.S. Representative
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FIGURE 16321
Distribution of Victory Margins - State Senate
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As with Washington’s elections, the vast majority of
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Arizona’s districts were decided by margins that exceeded ten
percent. Of the 150 state senate contests over eight years in the
“competitive” districts crafted by the IRC, only eighteen had
margins below ten percent, and only four of those fell within five
percent. Furthermore, in nearly one-third (forty-seven) of these
contests, the winner did not face an opponent in the general
election.
Why was the commission incapable of drawing competitive
districts?
Professor Michael McDonald, who worked as a
consultant with the commission, noted that the state’s
redistricting requirements (similar to those of California except
for the addition of competitiveness) prevented the creation of
many competitive districts.322 The commission’s chair pointed to
the Voting Rights Act’s protection of minorities and their
tendency to vote Democratic, and, echoing the findings of Cain et
al., the IRC chair noted that the resulting concentration of
Democrats in a small number of districts left few Democrats with
which to make the remaining districts competitive.323
What do the experiences of Washington and Arizona
suggest for California? Because of Arizona’s sizeable minority
population, redistricters’ hands were tied when trying to draw
competitive districts.324 California, however, has a much larger
minority population than does the Grand Canyon State.325 To
the extent demographics limited the competitiveness of Arizona’s
districts, California’s redistricters will surely find their hands
even more tightly bound by their own state’s demographics.
Washington, however, had a proportionately smaller
minority population than either Arizona or California had.326
Nevertheless, its commission did not craft significantly
competitive districts. Instead, it chose to develop a “status quo”
plan. More than anything else, this experience confirms that
commissions, be they purportedly bipartisan or nonpartisan, are
no more insulated from political considerations than is the
Legislature.327 Washington’s Redistricting Commission’s five

Hansen, supra note 307.
Id.
Profile of General Demographic Characteristics, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/QTSubjectShowTablesServlet?_lang=en&_ts=3133325
16005 (select table “DP-1”;; then click “Show Result”) (last visited Jan. 16, 2011).
325 According to the 2000 Census, 63.8% of Arizona’s population was non-Latino
white, whereas only 46.7% of California’s population was non-Latino white. Id.
326 The 2000 Census found that 78.9% of the Washington’s population was non-Latino
white. Id.
327 Christopher C. Confer, To Be About the People’s Business: An Examination of the
Utility of Nonpolitical/Bipartisan Legislative Redistricting Commissions, 13 KAN. J. L. &
PUB. POL’Y 115, 125 (2004).
322
323
324
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members could not agree on redistricting plans. After missing
the statutory deadline,328 the members eventually agreed to
make only minimal changes to the previous plan to adjust for
population shifts during the past decade. In the end, the only
conclusion to which they could all agree was to sacrifice
competitiveness.329
VI. IS PROPOSITION 11’S REDISTRICTING COMMISSION THE BEST
MEANS TO REDRAW CALIFORNIA’S LINES?
Will Proposition 11’s Citizens Redistricting Commission be
able to draw more competitive districts?
Arizona and
Washington, states which have imposed competitiveness goals on
their redistricting commissions, have had little success in
achieving competitiveness. Since California has not statutorily
included competitiveness among its requirements,330 the
likelihood of California’s commission achieving significant
competitiveness in the state’s districts is minimal.
Demographics331 and federal law332 will work against the
commission.
Arizona and Washington, states with predominantly white populations, needed to concentrate few of their
minority (and typically Democratic) voters into districts to
comply with the Voting Rights Act. Nevertheless, few of those
state’s districts are competitive.333 California’s majority-minority
population,
however,
necessitates
the
drawing
of
numerous majority-minority, heavily-Democratic districts.334
This concentration of Democratic voters, along with the
population’s geographic sorting, will render the drawing of a
significant number of competitive districts quite difficult.
If the commission will not be effective, might it actually be a
step back?
Some of the differences between independent
commissions and the Legislature may make the CRC the less
desirable body to redistrict the state.
328 The Washington legislature needed to pass a law retroactively changing the
statutory deadline after the commission could not approve a congressional plan until more
than two weeks after the required date. David Ammons, Lawmakers to Rescue New
Districts, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 10, 2002, at B5.
329 This is an example of the problem of the “bipartisan gerrymander.” A “bipartisan
commission,” with equal representation for both major parties, tends not to result in a
nonpartisan result, but rather a bipartisan one.
Desiring to avoid gridlock,
commissioners draw a map that is acceptable to both sides. As with the 2002 California
legislative redistricting and the 2002 commission redistrictings in Arizona and
Washington, rather than draw competitive districts, such plans primarily strengthen the
partisan district majorities already in place. Rosenbaum, supra note 317.
330 See supra note 171.
331 See supra text accompanying notes 233–275.
332 See supra text accompanying notes 220–232.
333 See supra text accompanying notes 302–305, 319–321.
334 See supra text accompanying notes 226–230.
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One of the primary arguments for adopting a commission
was to take redistricting away from the self-interested
Legislature.335 The Legislature may have a vested interest in the
outcome, but it also has more relevant knowledge and
experience.
Legislators are extremely familiar with their
districts, their constituents, and their needs, and they usually
have a better understanding of these concerns than do
outsiders.336 Legislators are thus best able to tailor districts to
represent constituent communities and their interests.337
Nathaniel Persily experienced this firsthand when he assisted
courts in drawing redistricting plans for New York and
Maryland. In one instance, he moved an uninhabited swamp
from one district to another.
Since this was uninhabited
swampland, a person unfamiliar with the district, such as
Persily, would justifiably have thought that such a move would
have no redistricting consequences (since it had no population)
and no political consequences (since the land had little value). A
legislator informed Persily, however, that this shift would
disrupt environmental projects that the legislator initiated and
hoped to complete. Thus, a move that would have no apparent
political effect had tangible policy consequences: persons
unfamiliar with the district would not be able to incorporate this
concern.338
Furthermore, the elected nature of legislators, rather than
rendering them less qualified, actually makes legislators better
suited to make the choices required by redistricting. The remap
process inherently involves tradeoffs among numerous
communities, constituent interests, and policies.339 Redistricting
“involves give and take in resolving conflicts among the various
standards and in considering the concerns, desires, and
objections of numerous interested persons and groups.”340 Line
drawers also make decisions about service relationships between
representatives and constituents and their placement within
larger policy programs or decisions.341 Legislators routinely
balance
complicated
policy
choices
and,
as
elected
See supra text accompanying notes 33–36.
Interview of Dr. Shauna Reilly, (Jan. 27, 2010), at 1:1-10 (on file with author).
Justin Levitt & Bethany Foster, A Citizen’s Guide to Redistricting, BRENNAN
CENTER FOR JUSTICE 23 (2008), http://brennan.3cdn.net/58180b7e66ce3d66bb_
5sm6bvr97.pdf.
338 Persily, supra note 205, at 678 nn.94–95. Persily also found that line drawers who
are unfamiliar with local communities are more likely to draw district boundaries
coterminous to subjurisdiction boundaries even when the actual communities of interest
extend beyond those lines. Id. at 678.
339 Brunell & Buchler, supra note 199, at 448–49.
340 Nadler v. Schwarzenegger, 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 92, 100 (2006).
341 Persily, supra note 205, at 679.
335
336
337
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representatives, are particularly qualified to do so.342 The
Supreme Court has recognized that legislatures exercise political
judgment in balancing competing interests,343 and that
legislatures are the institutions “best situated to identify and
then reconcile traditional state policies” within the redistricting
framework.344 In contrast to legislatively-controlled redistricting,
an appointed commission not only empowers less experienced
persons to make these tradeoffs, but the commissioners also lack
the accountability for their actions that legislators must confront
with each election.345
Legislative redistricting does have significant advantages.
Moreover, legal and demographic hurdles will prevent the CRC
from achieving its objective of significantly increasing the
competitiveness of California’s districts.
VII. KEEPING THE COMMISSION AND RETURNING REDISTRICTING
TO THE LEGISLATURE—BUT WITH A TWIST
Because of the Legislature’s knowledge regarding factors
that are relevant to the formulation of districts, as well as its
experience in balancing interests, it is the appropriate body to
draw the redistricting plan.
An independent commission,
however, could still serve a useful function in the redistricting
process.
The commission could review the plan developed by the
Legislature and propose changes.
To add teeth to its
recommendations, California law should give deference to the
commission’s proposals.
An independent commission is better suited to review a
redistricting plan, rather than to create it.
Because of
commission members’ lack of familiarity with the communities
and the government’s relationship to them, they will benefit by
having additional time to get up to speed and by observing the
Legislature’s redistricting hearings and decisions. Once the
342 Michael S. Kang, De-Rigging Elections: Direct Democracy and the Future of
Redistricting Reform, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 667, 697 (2006).
343 Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 915 (1995).
344 Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 414–15 (1977).
345 Kang, supra note 342, at 690. Critics also question whether an appointed body
can be representative of as diverse a population as that of California. This argument was
particularly powerful in helping defeat Proposition 77 and its redistricting commission of
three retired judges. Huefner, supra note 115, at 40–41. Although opponents of
Proposition 11 raised this point, it obviously did not carry the day. Nevertheless, as of
this writing, the application period for the Citizens Redistricting Commission has closed,
and only 11,000 of the 30,000 applicants are from minority candidates. Malcolm
Maclachlan, Group Effort Pushed Minority Outreach for Redistricting Commission,
CAPITOL WKLY., Feb. 25, 2010, at A1.
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Legislature has completed its plans, the commission could then
review those lines. Their review could proceed at three levels:
(1) Overall architecture—this would look at the overall
demographics of the plan. The commission would compare the
share of registered voters in each major party and the racial and
ethnic percentages of the statewide and regional population and
compare them to the anticipated totals for the proposed plans.
The objective of this review is to ensure that no groups are
especially over- or under-represented at the statewide level. An
example of a plan that would cause the commission concern
would be the 2002 Ohio redistricting plans, in which Republicans
controlled 61.6% of the seats even though they represented only
49.0% of the state’s registered voters.346
(2) Review of specific districts—the commission would review
the configuration of specific districts for irregularities. Concerns
here would include unnecessary splitting of communities of
interests and sub-jurisdictions, lack of compactness, irregular
district shapes, combination of dissimilar communities, and other
anomalies.
(3) A consideration of specific lines—this would focus on
specific streets and geographic features that the plan uses to
form districts. Practices that the commission addresses here
might include the “Kiskaddon Pimple” and the “Rasmussen
Stovepipe” from the Washington plans—situations where the
overall district configuration is acceptable but a particular
district’s exclusion or inclusion of a few blocks lacks
justification.347
To assist its review, the commission would consider public
testimony provided to the Legislature and the complete record of
its deliberations. It could also convene its own hearings to
receive public comment about the Legislature’s plans, which
would help to direct the commission’s attention. After concluding
its review, the commission would submit to the Legislature
written comments concerning the acceptability of its plan.
To encourage the Legislature to adopt the commission’s
recommendations, the deference that courts normally apply to
the Legislature’s plans should instead shift to the commission’s

346 Joe Hallett, Redistricting Comes Under Scrutiny, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 27,
2005, at A1. Not only did Ohio’s plans create a disparity between party registration and
electoral success, but its plans caused excessive noncompetitiveness in its districts. In the
election immediately preceding Issue 4, the state’s redistricting measure, the mean
margin of victory in Ohio’s 133 congressional and state legislative districts was forty-two
percent. Id.
347 Modie, supra note 290.
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work.
As discussed previously, prior to the adoption of
Proposition 11, California law mandated that the Legislature
redistrict the state.348 Under that process, the courts held that
California law entitled the Legislature’s determinations to great
deference as long as they constituted reasonable applications of
controlling state and federal law.
Courts extended such
deference even when equally reasonable alternatives might be
available.349 Courts deferred to the Legislature in the absence of
a showing that it unmistakably violated a particular provision of
the law.350 When considering a legislative redistricting, the court
not only applied deference, but judicial restraint.351
For
constitutional challenges to legislative redistrictings, courts have
presumed that the plans were constitutional and placed the
burden of proving a violation upon the challenger.352
If the courts instead extend this deference to the conclusions
of the reviewing commission, the Legislature would confront a
choice. It could modify its plan to be consistent with the
comments of the commission, or it could decline to alter its plan.
However, in any subsequent challenge on grounds raised by the
commission, courts would defer to the commission’s
recommendations as long as they were reasonable. Thus, to
defend its unaltered plan, the Legislature would need to
overcome the deference extended to the commission’s
recommendations.
Two examples show the effectiveness of this change. First,
assume a commission had reviewed the Washington redistricting
plan that contained the “Rasmussen Stovepipe.” A reviewing
commission might recommend that the narrow “Stovepipe”
extension sliced through a community, combined dissimilar
populations, and should be eliminated. In future litigation, the
Legislature would need to argue that such a recommendation
was not reasonable. In a second example, assume a commission
had reviewed the Ohio redistricting plan and suggested that the
Legislature modify it to balance more evenly the number of
majority-Democratic and majority-Republican districts under the
plan. Remember that Republicans controlled sixty percent of the
districts even though they held only a forty-nine percent to fortyeight percent registration lead statewide. Again, in any future

See supra Part I.A.
Nadler v. Schwarzenegger, 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 92, 100–01 (2006).
Id. at 98.
Assembly v. Deukmejian, 639 P.2d 939, 958 (1982). See also Easley v. Cromartie,
532 U.S. 234, 242 (2001) (observing that caution is particularly appropriate where the
legislature has “articulated a legitimate political explanation for its districting decision”).
352 Nadler, 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 98.
348
349
350
351
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litigation, the Legislature would need to explain why drawing a
more balanced plan was not reasonable. Conversely, if the
commission recommends that a politically-balanced plan be tilted
to favor one of the parties, the Legislature might be willing to
contest in court the reasonableness of such a recommendation in
a legal challenge to its plan.
The establishment of a reviewing commission thus has
several advantages. First, it places upon the Legislature a
tremendous burden to overcome if it decides not to adopt the
commission’s recommendations. Even if the Legislature believes
its initial plan is justified, it must be able to establish that the
commission’s alternative is not even reasonable. Because of the
high burden it must satisfy, counsel often will urge the
Legislature to adopt the recommendations so as to retain control
over the remap process. A second advantage is that the
Legislature retains responsibility for the initial architecture of
the plan in the Legislature, the body that is most familiar with
the pertinent representational considerations, the best able to
begin the process quickly, and most accountable to the voters.
This system, however, would provide a significant check on the
Legislature. Third, this system better utilizes the commission,
allowing it more time to prepare and not demanding that it learn
the minutiae of district representation, while providing a fuller
record for its consideration. Fourth, it allows the Legislature to
retain its plan if it believes the recommendations of the
commission are not reasonable. Finally, it allows for public
comment after the Legislature has developed its plan.
CONCLUSION
Proposition 11’s redistricting commission is unlikely to
provide a significant change in the competitiveness of the state’s
districts. A better approach would leave redistricting in the
hands of the body most experienced in performing the policy
trade-offs required by the redistricting process. A commission
could be most helpful not in drawing lines, but in reviewing the
maps developed by the Legislature.
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APPENDIX353

1948
1958
1958
1958
1960
1966
1970
1976
1982
1986
1990
1994
1994
1998
2002
2010

President
Lieutenant Governor
Secretary of State
Controller
President
Controller
Attorney General
President
Governor
Senator
Attorney General
Senator
Secretary of State
Secretary of State
Controller
Attorney General

Statewide
Differential
0.5
1.8
0.9
0.6
0.5
1.0
1.4
1.8
1.2
1.4
0.4
1.9
0.5
1.1
0.3
0.6

Percent of Statewide Votes in
Counties Decided by:
<5%
>10%
>20%
73.5
24.5
9.9
63.7
20.2
2.0
61.0
14.6
2.8
60.7
14.8
1.2
51.4
30.3
5.1
6.5
41.1
10.4
7.4
45.4
18.8
55.5
28.8
8.7
9.8
32.4
19.6
16.5
75.2
20.7
32.7
57.6
23.1
7.5
90.7
40.4
6.3
87.3
21.4
0.7
81.9
26.3
8.7
85.1
27.4
5.8
92.3
32.4

353 See
DAVID
LEIP’S
ATLAS
OF
U.S.
PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS,
http://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/index.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2011); Statewide
Election Results, CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/
elections_elections.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2011); United States Presidential Election in
California, 1948, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_presidential_
election_in_California,_1948 (last visited Jan. 9, 2011). The author’s calculations, based
on data obtained from the above sources, are on file with the author.

